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In the West, it is a well-established legal notion that non-human animals 
are classified as the personal property of humans. This classification 
allows humans to use non-human animals as a resource. A non-human 
animals’ property status means they have no legal capacity or standing to 
sue and thus cannot protect their interests in court. This thesis argues that 
non-human animals are sentient beings who deserve equal consideration 
of their interests, hence they should not be treated like inanimate objects 
or mere property. In order for this to occur, the legal status of non-human 
animals must change from a classification of ‘property’ to a classification 
that more closely resembles ‘personhood.’ As legal ‘persons,’ non-human 
animals would be extended the same rights as humans, particularly the 
fundamental right not to be treated as the resource of another. This thesis 
reviews both primary and secondary sources, particularly those from 
Western countries outside of Australia, such as the United States, to 
determine how non-human animals may make this transition from within 
a legal context. This thesis identifies that an important first step is to 
abolish the property status of non-human animals. Due to the significance 
of such a change, removing the property status of animals can only be 
realistically achieved through incremental steps. Expanding the standing 
doctrine to include non-human animals so that they may sue in their own 
right is also a necessary legal change. In addition, non-human animals’ 
rights, or ‘dignity,’ must be given constitutional force and the resulting 
legislation must recognise their interests, minus any exemptions or 
exclusions that might diminish those interests. The judiciary, rather than 
being precedent bound, ought to embrace the flexibility of the common 
law and make decisions which incorporate modern science and changing 
societal values towards animals. Adopting these legal reforms will assist 
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The past few decades have seen the issue of the treatment and use of non-human 
animals,1 both domestic and wild, attract vigorous and often heated debate. This thesis 
intends to extend the debate regarding the use, and more often abuse, of non-human 
animals beyond that which exists today. Specifically, this thesis will address the legal 
status of animals as property and demonstrate how their current status prevents them 
from being anything other than the object of human ownership and control. This thesis 
contends that nothing less than a classification into something that resembles 
‘personhood’ will satisfactorily improve the lives of non-human animals. Put simply, 
this thesis argues that non-human animals should not be classified as property and 
instead should be classified as ‘persons’ under law. As ‘persons’, non-human animals 
should be extended the same rights as humans, including the fundamental right not to 
be used as a resource or as means to meet human ends. Essentially, this thesis adopts 
an ‘animal rights’ approach as opposed to an ‘animal welfare’ approach.2  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, any reference to the terms ‘non-human animal’ or 
‘animal’ will include all sentient beings. Sentience is predicated on a living creature’s 
ability to experience pain and suffering, along with the ability to seek out pleasure. 
This thesis will therefore base its test of sentience on whether that being would recoil 
from painful stimuli or, alternatively, seek out pleasurable experiences to enhance its 
life. Sentient beings include, for example, an ant that recoils from a flame or a fish that 
struggles on a hook, as well as a lizard that seeks out the pleasurable heat of the sun 
on a rock. Therefore, every class of animal, from the largest to the smallest creature 
that can feel pain or seek out pleasure, is considered sentient for the purposes of this 
thesis. Consideration of any other ‘human-like’ characteristics is not required to meet 
the test of sentience. As Bentham puts it in his oft-quoted footnote, ‘the question is 
not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’3 Any reference to a 
non-human animal will refer to any living being that can feel pain and/or pleasure, no 
                                                             
1 The term ‘non-human animal’ will be used throughout this thesis to reflect the position that we all 
belong to the animal species, but some of us are of the ‘non-human’ as opposed to the ‘human’ variety. 
2 An ‘animal rights’ position is against the use of animals for any reason whatsoever whereas the ‘animal 
welfare’ position allows the use of animals so long as they are treated ‘humanely’ and  experience as 
little suffering as possible in pursuit of that use. 
3 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Prometheus Books, 
1988) 310 [first published 1781] (Emphasis in original). 
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matter how ‘like us’ these animals are. Accordingly, ‘humanness’ is irrelevant to the 
central premise of the argument proposed within this thesis. 
 
The fundamental position of this thesis is that the use of non-human animals cannot 
be morally justified for any reason. This thesis refutes the widely held assumption that 
it is appropriate to use animals for food, clothing, sport, entertainment, recreation, 
protection, labour, medical research4 and even companionship. This thesis holds that 
the use of animals for these purposes is unnecessary and therefore unjustifiable. It is 
acknowledged that many disagree with this premise, some even vehemently, but it is 
also recognised that some wholeheartedly agree with it. The growing number of well-
respected legal scholars and philosophers in this field attest to that fact.5 Not to 
mention the animal advocacy movements that are gathering momentum within local 
communities and also the changing opinions toward better treatment of non-human 
animals amongst wider society.6 As former President of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Professor David Weisbrot AM stated, animal protection may just be ‘the 
next great social justice movement.’7 
 
Unfortunately though, those who reject the use of non-human animals comprise the 
minority, with the majority of the population utilising animals for their own needs, 
regardless of whether they believe it morally wrong. The global ignorance displayed 
by the masses to the suffering of animals stems from the fact that the use of animals is 
so firmly entrenched in our everyday lives. Most people do not give it a second thought 
or, if they do, they are misinformed of the facts.8 For instance, from the time a person 
                                                             
4 There are some very rare exceptions in the case of medical research where animal use is justified, such 
as using animals to find cures for very serious human illnesses. See further Gary Francione, Introduction 
to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog (Temple University Press, 2000) 31-49. 
5 United States university legal scholars such as Professor Gary Francione and Professor Taimie Bryant 
are two such scholars who will be heavily referenced in this thesis. 
6 The recent protests in Western Australia concerning the Liberal Government’s shark cull policy are 
an example of the local community’s opposition to the infringement of a shark’s ‘right’ to exist in its 
natural habitat undisturbed and unharmed. See SBS News ‘Thousands Protests Against WA Shark Cull 
Policy’ February 1, 2014 <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/02/01/thousands-protest-against-
wa-shark-cull-policy>. See also Jeff Welty, ‘Foreword - Animal Law: Thinking about the Future’ 
(2007) 70(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 1, where it is held that the ‘explosive growth of the field 
of animal law provides some evidence that there is momentum for change.’ 
7 David Weisbrot, ‘Comment’ (2007/2008) 91 Reform 2. See also Dr Ian Robertson, ‘Animal law with 
teeth – Legislative change and legal advocacy in the 21st century’ Biosecurity Magazine, May 1, 2007 
<http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/publications/biosecurity-magazine/issue-75/animal-law-with-teeth>. 
8 Katrina Sharman, 'Farm Animals and Welfare Law: An Unhappy Union' in Peter Sankoff, Steven 
White, and Celeste Black (eds) Animal Law in Australasia (The Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 63. 
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in our Western culture wakes up in the morning and conducts mundane tasks such as 
pouring milk on their cereal, or in their coffee or tea, or spreading butter on their toast 
(which might also accompany their eggs and bacon) they have already participated, 
most times unwittingly, in an industry - specifically the factory farming industry - 
which predicates its existence on the use and abuse of non-human animals.  
 
This thesis recognises the significant shift that is required, from a societal perspective, 
for animals not to be used as a resource. For example, not only would humans need to 
recognise the inherent value of non-human animals, effectively removing the potential 
to use animals as a resource, but they would also need to sacrifice current aspects of 
their lifestyle, and even in some cases their livelihoods, in order to realise such a 
premise. This would mean giving up eating meat,9 along with all dairy products,10 
eggs11 and honey.12 It also means not wearing wool, fur, leather or any other animal 
skins13 and refraining from hunting and fishing activities.14 Additionally it means not 
visiting or supporting zoos, circuses, rodeos, horse and dog racing venues, and not 
owning pets. These sacrifices are often too difficult for the average person which is 
why the agricultural, fur and animal entertainment and sporting industries still exist. 
Nevertheless, not using animals is doable as there are humans who have chosen to stop 
using animals in all aspects of their lives by adopting veganism. Vegans, however, 
                                                             
9 The growth of the synthetic or in vitro meat industry would overcome this issue. See Peter Singer and 
Jim Mason, The Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter (Holtzbrinck Publishers, 2006) 262-263. 
See also Alok Jha, ‘Synthetic Meat: How the World’s Costliest Burger Made it on to the Plate’ The 
Guardian, August 6, 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/aug/05/synthetic-meat-burger-
stem-cells>. 
10 Francione states that ‘there is more suffering in a glass of milk than in a pound of steak.’ See Deb 
Olin Unferth, ‘Interview with Gary Francione’ The Believer, February 2011 
<http://www.believermag.com/issues/201102/?read=interview_francione>. 
11 Over 10 million roosters are killed every year as ‘waste’ products of the egg industry. See Animal 
Planet, ‘Egg Industry Grinds Millions of Baby Chicks Alive’ September 7, 2009 
<http://blogs.discovery.com/animal_news/2009/09/horrific-egg-industry-grinds-millions-of-baby-
chicks-alive.html>.  
12 In order to produce the massive amounts of honey demanded worldwide, bees are also subject to 
abusive factory farming practices. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) ‘Honey: 
From Factory-Farmed Bees’ accessed September 4, 2014 <http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-
for-food/animals-used-food-factsheets/honey-factory-farmed-bees/>. 
13 The Inuit may be the only remaining culture that requires the protection of wearing animal skins to 
survive, however, this is also changing as modern clothing reaches these isolated people. See 
Countries and Their Cultures, ‘Inuit’ under ‘Clothing’ accessed September 7, 2014 
<http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Brazil-to-Congo-Republic-of/Inuit.html>.  
14 Overfishing is a major global issue with the frightful prediction that ‘if fishing rates continue apace, 
all the world's fisheries will have collapsed by the year 2048.’ See National Geographic, ‘Overfishing: 




comprise only a small percentage of the Western world’s total population15 which is 
unsurprising because the majority of people, including the vast number of vegetarians 
worldwide, still use animals and/or animal products in abundance.  
 
Whilst this thesis recognises the momentous societal shift (along with the utmost 
necessity of such a shift) that would need to occur for non-human animals to no longer 
be used as a resource, the societal requirements will not be its main focus. Instead, this 
thesis will focus on the possible prospects for realising this premise from within a legal 
context. This, however, will not be an easy task considering the current existence of a 
legal framework that sanctions the widespread use, and often abuse, of non-human 
animals. The most obvious and blatant example of legally sanctioned abuse of animals 
occurs in the case of agriculturally produced animals. Today, humans are consuming 
more ‘food’ animals than ever before in human history.16 According to Francione, in 
the United States (US) alone, more than 8 billion animals a year are killed for food.17 
That equates to the slaughter of approximately 23 million animals per day, or 950,000 
per hour, or almost 16,000 per minute, or more than 260 every second.18 Undeniably 
these are staggering figures, with the sheer size of the numbers being almost 
incomprehensible. Unfortunately for food animals, these figures are reflected in many 
other countries throughout the world which adopt factory farming practices,19 
including Australia.20 Thus, the worth of a food animal is based purely on their value 
as a resource for humans. The only way this can occur is because non-human animals 
                                                             
15 The Vegan Research Panel estimate that in 2007 approximately 1% of people were vegan in the US: 
http://www.imaner.net/panel/statistics.htm#reveal. This also reflects the figures for Australia in 2010: 
http://www.vegetarianvictoria.org.au/going-vegetarian/statistics-on-vegetarianism.html. It is estimated 
that less than 1% of people adopted a vegan diet in the UK for the period between 2010 until 2012: 
https://www.vegsoc.org/sslpage.aspx?pid=753. These figures vary though and are difficult to verify as 
there are many studies which report conflicting results. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that a very 
small percentage (around 1-2%) of the Western world’s population have adopted a vegan diet. This, of 
course, would be higher in Eastern countries, such as India, due to their Hindu religious beliefs. 
16 Gary Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (Columbia 
University Press, 2008) 9. 
17 Ibid 26. These statistics do not include the billions of sea animals killed every year. 
18 Ibid. 
19 According to the Worldwatch Institute, factory farming is not an exclusive phenomenon of rich 
Western countries as many poor developing countries are also adopting these practices. See Danielle 
Nierenberg, ‘Factory Farming in the Developing World’ (2003) 16(3) Worldwatch Magazine 10. 
20 In Australia, more than half a billion animals are raised for food production. See Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, ‘Livestock Slaughterings and Products’ Australian Farming in Brief, 2013, Cat No 




are the property of humans. Of course, it is not only food animals that are property, 
but all other animals which are the subject of human use.  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis outlines the origins of the property status of non-human 
animals, describing how they were classified as ‘things’ under Roman law which could 
be owned via the simple act of possession. It also addresses the unique position of wild 
animals which, according to current laws, belong to no one until lawfully captured or 
killed. The ‘special’ status of companion animals is also discussed to highlight our 
‘moral schizophrenia’ when it comes to the treatment of different types of animals.21 
This chapter places particular emphasis on the concept of human primacy and the 
superior position humans believe they hold over non-human animals; a concept which 
forms the foundation of an animal’s status as property. The concept of the ‘property 
paradigm’ will be introduced to demonstrate the dominance of human interests (the 
property owner) over non-human animal interests (the property). To balance these 
arguments, theories that support the property status of non-human animals will also be 
recognised in this chapter. This chapter will end with arguments as to why non-human 
animals should not be considered the property of humans, but rather legal persons in 
their own right. 
 
The property status of non-human animals not only impacts their use and treatment, 
but also negates their legal capacity to sue as they do not satisfy the tests of standing; 
a matter which Chapter 2 of this thesis will explore. To be granted standing, one must 
first have the capacity to sue which equates to being recognised as a ‘person’ under 
law. As we know, a ‘person’ has capacity to sue regardless of whether they are a human 
or non-human (artificial) entity, such as corporations and governments. The 
‘humanness’ of the entity is irrelevant so long as they are recognised as ‘persons’ by 
the courts. The problem for non-human animals is that they are classified as ‘property’ 
not ‘persons,’ therefore they do not have capacity to sue and hence must rely on 
humans to represent their interests in court. This representation creates a number of 
issues for humans, particularly those working in animal welfare organisations, in 
meeting the tests of standing as they must demonstrate that they have a personal stake 
                                                             
21 Francione coined this phrase to identify the profound disparity that humans display not only to the 
treatment of some animals over others, but between what we say we believe about animals, i.e. that we 
take their interests seriously, and how we actually treat them. See Francione, above n 16, 26-8. 
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or ‘special interest’ in the case and not merely a concern for the non-human animals 
they are representing. Chapter 2 delves further into these issues and provides 
arguments as to how standing can be extended to include non-human animals, just as 
it does for artificial persons. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of legal ‘personhood’ as a possible means of 
removing the status of property of non-human animals. As Francione states ‘[t]o 
possess the basic right not to be treated as property is a minimal prerequisite to being 
a moral and legal person.’22 Legal personhood is commonly understood to comprise a 
certain set of rights and obligations which are attached to a ‘person’ defined by law, 
such as the right not to be treated as the resource of another, or the obligation not to 
inflict unjustified pain and suffering on another. Chapter 3 will expand on these views 
and provide both a broad and narrow definition of legal personhood. This chapter will 
outline the various theoretical manifestations of legal personhood that may apply to 
non-human animals, such as guardianship, equitable self-ownership, and citizenship, 
to name a few. This chapter will then highlight the criticisms that these theories have 
attracted from various commentators, both from within the pro- and anti-animal rights 
factions. A brief critique of legal personhood from a feminist perspective, along with 
a short discussion of the term ‘personhood’ as an inappropriate lexis, will complete 
this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the requirements for a non-human animal to transition from 
their status as property to a status that resembles, or has the characteristics of, legal 
personhood from within a legal context. This chapter will achieve this goal in two 
steps. First, it will address whether legal personhood is attainable for non-human 
animals. The flexibility of the common law and its ability to grant legal personhood to 
entities other than humans shows that it is. Second, it will identify the legal 
requirements of a non-human animal’s transition to legal personhood. These 
requirements include changes in legislation and constitutional amendments that truly 
recognise animals and their interests, along with the need for progressive and 
enlightened judicial decision-making. It also includes reconceptualising what, in fact, 
constitutes ‘property’ in the 21st Century. This second step also includes a discussion 
                                                             
22 Ibid 51 (emphasis in original). 
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on abolishing the property status of animals and addressing their lack of standing, as 
well as identifying the economic and technological considerations required to make 
this legal transition. Throughout this chapter, frequent reference will be made to legal 
personhood from within an international context, describing how it is dealt with in 
relation to non-human animals. From these international references the differences, 
apart from becoming obvious, will provide vital lessons for Australian legislators and 
courts, especially those that originate from countries considered more progressive in 
the ‘animal rights’ sphere, such as countries of the European Union. This chapter will 
adopt these lessons and apply them to the current Australian legal framework in order 
to develop a legal system which assists non-human animals’ to transition from a 
classification of property to one of legal personhood. 
 
The methodology and theoretical classification of this thesis is reformist-based, with 
its primary focus on change from within an Australian legal framework. Whilst this 
thesis focuses predominantly on legal change, it also reviews change from a multi-
disciplinary approach incorporating politics, philosophy, sociology and ethics. The 
majority of this thesis’ research is sourced from existing secondary sources, including 
journal articles, books and reputable animal advocate websites. Primary sources are 
also referenced, with frequently cited case law from the US. The heavy reliance on US 
case law is due to its abundance and its demonstrable worth in providing pertinent 
examples of the application of the common law to non-human animals. Unless 
specifically stated otherwise, all legislation referred to applies within Western 
Australia (WA). Although the laws of WA are mostly cited, these laws may be 





II CHAPTER 1: LEGAL STATUS OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 
A Non-Human Animals as Property 
1 The Origins of the Property Status of Animals - from a Western Perspective23 
The legal status of animals as the property of humans has remained largely unchanged 
for the past two thousand years.24 Its origins lie with the ancient Romans who 
developed systems of law which have had a significant impact on the way our legal 
systems in the West have evolved.25 This is particularly so for the area of property law 
whereby a person’s legal right to own and control animals as their property, that is, as 
a ‘natural’ right, is now a long-standing common law tradition.26 The idea that 
everything existed for the sake of humans was at the core of these ancient laws and 
was equally reflected in the religious and biblical testaments of the time.27 The Stoics 
embraced this idea and believed that non-human animals were literally made for 
humans. From their point of view, the savage beasts were created to foster their 
courage; the singing birds existed to entertain them; the living cows and sheep kept 
their meat fresh; the lobsters provided food and nifty body armour; and the lice made 
them adopt clean habits.28 This human-centric view has prevailed throughout Western 
history; resulting in the well-established legal notion that non-human animals are the 
‘personal property,’ or even the ‘goods,’ of humans.29 
 
According to the ancient Romans, non-human animals were able to be acquired via 
different modes, the most common being occupatio, that is, by simply taking 
possession of it.30 This applied to any animal that was not, nor ever had been, the object 
                                                             
23 Like Peter Singer stated in his seminal works, Animal Liberation (Harper Collins Publishers, 1975) 
185, this thesis will focus on the Western world, not because other countries are inferior - which they 
usually are not when it comes to treatment of their non-human animals - but because Western ideas 
have spread to most human societies world-wide, whether capitalist or communist, and thus are most 
relevant and applicable to the topic of this thesis. 
24 Deborah Cao, Katrina Sharman and Steven White, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand 
(LawBook Co, 2010) 63. 
25 Ibid 63-4. 
26 Gary Francione, Animals, Property and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995) 38. 
27 Indeed, Man was designated by God ‘to rule over the fish of the sea, the fowl of the skies, the cattle, 
the earth, and all creatures that roam over the earth.’ Genesis 1:26, 28.  
28 Steven Wise, ‘Animal Rights, One Step at a Time’ in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds) 
Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004) 19, 24. 
29 Section 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) defines animals, including fish, as 
‘goods.’ See, eg, Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 where domestic animals were held to be 
‘property’; Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd v McBride [1976] 2 NSWLR 631 where animals were 
held to ‘fall within the definition of’ goods’; Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser [2007] 
FCA 1535 where ‘goods’ under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was held to include animals. 
30 Cao, Sharman and White, above n 24, 65. 
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of ownership, or, if formerly owned, had been abandoned by their owner.31 Codified 
in Roman law, Justinian’s Institutes clearly state that ‘[w]ild animals, birds and fish, 
the creatures of the land, sea and sky, become the property of the taker as soon as they 
are caught.’32 The Romans believed that where something (including a non-human 
animal) has no owner, it is reasonable that the person who takes it should have it.33 
This reflects our current laws which provide that animals in the wild belong to no one 
until lawfully captured or killed.34 Specifically, where a wild animal is not protected 
under laws which cover endangered species, such as ‘pest’ wild animals, and is 
captured and killed by a human, then it becomes the property of the captor.35 The 
Romans further stipulated that the owner of an animal also owns its offspring as well 
as the ‘fruits’ of the animal, such as the milk, hair and wool.36 Again, this is reflected 
in our current laws whereby the captor of an animal also owns the ‘eggs, larvae or 
semen’ and ‘carcass, skin, plumage or fur’ of the animal.37 Thus, human ownership of 
a non-human animal is considerably thorough. 
 
2 Non-Human Animals Classified as ‘Things’ 
The ancient Romans classified law into a trichotomy of persons, things and actions 
which has continued to prevail under our common law tradition.38 As Cao, Sharman 
and White recount, ‘under Roman law, a person had rights, but a thing was the object 
of the rights of a person.’39 At that time, the Romans classified all those beings that 
they thought lacked free will as ‘things,’ such as women, children, slaves, the insane 
and non-human animals.40 Hence, a non-human animal was a ‘thing’ capable of being 
owned by a person as their property. Therefore, animals could be bought, sold, 
transferred, stolen41 and killed by their owner.42 Wise describes this legal ‘thinghood’ 
                                                             
31 Ibid. This ‘qualified’ right of ownership applies to wild animals, but not to domestic animals who 
escape from their owners as the property right still resides with the original owner, i.e. the owner 
maintains an ‘absolute’ right of ownership in the domestic animal. See Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 
351 [80] (Gummow J). 
32 Justinian’s Institutes (P Birks and G McLeod, with the Latin text of P Krueger trans, Cornell 
University Press, 1987) 55-56. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA) s 6. However, under s 22(1) of this Act, until such time when 
an animal is lawfully taken, property in the animal is vested in the Crown. 
35 Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA) s 16 where the taking of protected fauna is an offence. 
36 Cao, Sharman and White, above n 24, 66. 
37 Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA) s 6. 
38 Cao, Sharman and White, above n 24, 64. 
39 Ibid (emphasis added). 
40 Ibid 65. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Mike Radford, Animal Welfare in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 
2001) 100-2 quoted in Cao, Sharman and White, above n 24, 77-8. 
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as belonging to an entity which has no capacity for legal rights, and whose interests, if 
they even exist, are not required to be respected.43 As Balcombe suggests, ‘when 
animals are categorised as “things” they cease to exist as autonomous individuals with 
feelings and lives worth living’ and thus humans are free to do with them as they 
wish.44 Even the terms we use when describing non-human animals reinscribes the 
notion that non-human animals are mere ‘things,’ such as ‘whaling quotas,’ ‘fish 
stocks’ or ‘livestock.’45 As Wise succinctly puts it, ‘[l]egally, persons count; things 
don’t.’46 Therefore, as long as non-human animals remain the property of humans, 
they will never count as anything other than things. 
 
3 The ‘Special’ Status of Companion Animals  
It is undeniable that companion animals enjoy a ‘special’ status over those animals 
who are used for food and/or clothing, or in entertainment or for scientific experiments. 
Today, it is not unusual to have a companion animal in the home for which their owners 
have expended large amounts of money and time to ensure they are properly fed 
(sometimes with meals that are considered gourmet), adequately exercised, amused 
(with toys), medically treated when ill/injured and then respectfully buried upon their 
deaths.47 Companion animals are frequently referred to as ‘family members’ and 
sometimes are even the subject of custody disputes or identified as the beneficiaries of 
large estates.48 Therefore, it appears that the type of animal, along with the relationship 
humans have with that type of animal, is central to the value being accorded to it.49 
For example, it is not socially acceptable to eat dogs or cats or wear their fur in 
                                                             
43 Steven Wise, ‘The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals’ (1996) 23(3) Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 471, 472. 
44 Jonathan Balcombe, Second Nature: The Inner Lives of Animals (Macmillan, 2010) 171. 
45 Sharman, above n 8, 63. 
46 Wise, above n 28, 25. 
47 Rebecca Huss, ‘Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion 
Animals’ (2002) 86 Marquette Law Review 47, 48-50. This, of course, is not the experience of all 
companion animals, but it is most likely the experience of the vast majority. See also Cass Sunstein, 
‘Introduction: What are Animal Rights?’ in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds) Animal Rights: 
Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004) 3 who comments that at least 
half of all owned companion animals receive birthday and Christmas presents.  
48 Drake Bennett, ‘Lawyer for the dog: Inside the booming field of animal law, in which animals have 
their own interests – and their own lawyers’ Boston Globe, September 9, 2007 
<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/09/09/lawyer_for_the_dog/>; Mike Dogtime, 
‘The Richest Dogs and Cats in the World’ Dogtime – Find Your Wag, March 23, 2012  
<http://dogtime.com/the-richest-dogs-and-cats-in-the-world.html>. In the US, the Uniform Trust Code 
1993 provides legislation for ‘pet trusts.’ See Diane Sullivan and Holly Vietzke, ‘An Animal is Not an 
iPod’ (2008) 4 Journal of Animal Law 41, 56. However, because there is no equivalent legislation in 
Australia, pet trusts are unlikely to be established under the current legal framework. See Frances 
Hannah, ‘Succession Law: Leaving a Legacy for Pets’ (2008) 28(10) Proctor 17, 19. 
49 Huss, above n 47, 51 (emphasis added).  
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countries such as Australia, the US and the United Kingdom.50 In comparison to 
farmed or research animals from these same countries (which includes dogs and cats), 
it appears that companion animals are viewed differently and treated better (in most 
cases) due to the value accorded to them by their human owners. However, as 
Bogdanoski affirms, this ‘special’ status does not necessarily guarantee a greater 
benefit for these non-human animals due to the inescapable fact they are still the 
property of humans who may revoke the ‘family’ status of their companion animals at 
any time.51 This is reflected in the alarmingly high rate of companion animals who end 
up in shelters when they are no longer convenient to their human owners’ needs or 
lifestyles.52 Thus, this ‘special’ status does not provide a companion animal with any 
further protection other than what their property status permits. 
 
B Human Primacy over Non-Human Animals  
The dominance of humans over non-human animals can be traced as far back as the 
creation of the universe.53 The Bible tells us that God made man in His own image and 
instructed man to go forth, procreate and subdue the earth and dominate all living 
creatures on it.54 Thus, this God-like image has allotted humans (particularly white 
males) a special position in the universe, placed at the pinnacle of creation, with God’s 
permission to kill and eat other animals.55 The Greeks went a bit further by retaining 
‘some’ men (usually blacks), along with all animals, as property for their ‘masters.’56 
This created a ‘hierarchy of nature’ whereby those men with (perceived) higher 
reasoning capacities sat at the top of the hierarchy dominating those inferior humans 
(ie black men, women, children), with animals invariably sitting at the bottom.57 
Hence, the superiority of the ‘wealthy white male’ emerged and has been reinforced 
within our society ever since. 
                                                             
50 Ibid.  
51 Tony Bogdanoski, ‘A Companion Animal’s Worth: The Only ‘Family Member’ Still Regarded as 
Legal Property’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven White, and Celeste Black (eds) Animal Law in Australasia 
(The Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 85. See also Taimie Bryant, ‘Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: 
Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of 
Humans’ (2008) 39 Rutgers Law Journal 247, 256-57 where it is suggested the claim that animals enjoy 
the same benefits and lifestyle as ‘family members’ is overstated. 
52 Steven White, ‘Companion Animals: Members of the Family or Legally Discarded Objects?’ (2009) 
32(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 852, 868.  
53 Singer, above n 23, 186. 
54 Ibid 187. 
55 Ibid 188. 
56 For example, Aristotle was well known for supporting slavery and referred to those inferior humans 
as merely a ‘living instrument’ for their masters. See Singer, above n 23, 188-89. 




The Christians added another dimension to the superiority of humans by spreading the 
idea that every human life – and only human life – is sacred because only humans have 
immortal souls.58 Considering the significant influence of Christianity on Western 
culture, there is no wonder that the theories of preeminent saints such Saint Thomas 
Aquinas have survived until today. For example, in considering the treatment of non-
human animals, Aquinas held the view that the only reason to take a stance against 
cruelty to animals is that it may lead to cruelty to human beings.59 Although not the 
only reason, this is an argument frequently used against animal cruelty today.60 
Thankfully, attitudes toward non-human animals tended to improve after the barbarity 
of Descartes’s era,61 although the practicality of how we act and how we treat non-
human animals has not really changed. Modern arguments which hold that ‘humans 
must have primacy [because] human suffering will ultimately increase if we begin 
viewing ourselves on the same level as animals’62 echo those religious-based 
arguments of our enduring past. Indelibly, humans remain at the ‘top of the tree.’ 
 
C The ‘Property Paradigm’ 
In reflecting on the priority given to the interests of non-human animals, Singer states 
that ‘[t]heir interests are allowed to count only when they do not clash with human 
interests. If there is a clash…the interests of the nonhuman are disregarded.’63 This 
attitude forms the basis of the ‘property paradigm.’ Gary Francione, a well-respected 
law professor, legal philosopher and author in the field of animal rights, passionately 
argues that there is ‘no morally sound reason to continue to treat nonhumans as the 
property of humans.’64 Francione frequently raises the property paradigm to illustrate 
the dominance of the interests of property owners over the interests of their animal 
                                                             
58 Ibid 191. 
59 Ibid 196. 
60 Cynthia Hodges, ‘The Link: Cruelty to Animals and Violence towards People’ Animal Legal & 
Historical Center (2008) accessed September 5, 2014, 
<http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arus2008hodges_link.htm#intro>. 
61 Philosopher Rene Descartes was infamous for his view that because animals do not have souls they 
are mere machines or ‘automata’ and therefore cannot experience pleasure or pain and thus could be 
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62 Richard Cupp, ‘A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and Limited Personhood as Stepping 
Stones Toward Abolishing Animals' Property Status’ (2007) 60 Southern Methodist University Law 
Review 3, 28. 
63 Singer, above n 23, 212. 
64 Francione, above n 26, 67. 
13 
 
property. For example, in reference to modern animal welfare laws for factory farmed 
animals, Francione argues that ‘these laws serve the interests of industrial agriculture 
and ensnare animals further in the property paradigm.’65 The result of this position, 
according to Francione, is that: 
[t]he property status of animals renders completely meaningless any balancing that is 
supposedly required under the humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws, 
because what we really balance are the interests of property owners against the 
interests of their animal property… Such a balance will rarely, if ever, tip in the 
animal’s favour…66 
 
Therefore, Francione strongly advocates that we eliminate, not merely regulate with 
welfare laws, animal exploitation by abolishing their property status.67 Taimie Bryant, 
another prominent law professor in the field of animal law, agrees and holds that, 
‘because the property status of animals is so far removed from a position of respecting 
animals, any attempt at animal law reform, whilst maintaining their status as property, 
is fruitless.’68 Bogdanoski provides a similar argument to Francione’s and Bryant’s 
above, but applies it in the context of companion animals. He holds that the ‘pets-as-
property paradigm’ ignores a companion animal’s intrinsic worth and makes them 
mere commodities of their human owners.69 Bogdanoski argues that, even though it is 
typical for pet owners to assign ‘family’ status to their companion animal, under the 
current property paradigm the interests of the owner will always prevail over those of 
their pet.70 Thus the property paradigm has the potential to negatively impact, albeit 
not equally, the lives of all non-human animals. 
 
D Protection in Property 
Not everyone agrees that the property status of non-human animals leads to their 
exploitation and instead argue that their property status provides them with a benefit 
of protection that they would not otherwise receive. As White suggests, these 
arguments are usually based on the premise that ‘people tend to protect what they 
                                                             
65 Gary Francione, ‘Animal as Property’ (Presentation) accessed 15 September, 2014 
<http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/media/slides/theory2.html>. 
66 Francione, above n 4, xxiv-v. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Bryant, above n 51, 253. 
69 Bogdanoski, above n 51, 84.  
70 Ibid. See also Brooke Bearup, ‘Pets: Property and the Paradigm of Protection’ (2007) 3 Journal of 
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own.’71 Epstein, an avid supporter of the property status of non-human animals, holds 
that assuming non-human animals suffer at the hands of their owners is incorrect. He 
argues that there is ‘no necessary conflict between owners and their animals’ 
particularly those that are treated as part of the owner’s ‘family.’72 Although Epstein 
acknowledges that human ownership may not always benefit animals, he claims that 
most of the time it does so by providing them with benefits in the form of access to 
food and shelter (and sometimes clothing) which creates long lives of ease and 
comfort.73 With regard to veterinary care, Epstein argues that ‘it’s better to be a sick 
cat in a middle-class US household than a sick peasant in a third-world country.’74 
While this may be true, White criticises Epstein’s arguments for being singularly 
focused on companion animals and for not considering the plight of non-human 
animals that are used in research or produced in factory farms.75 Most of Epstein’s 
arguments do, in fact, concern companion animals. However, White notes that when 
he does make (albeit brief) reference to cattle, he does so in relation to the way in 
which they are slaughtered, ie if the animal is killed in a way that spares them 
unnecessary anxiety, the amount and quality of meat that is left behind improves.76 It 
is unlikely that this is much of a concern for the soon to be slaughtered cow, who is 
most certainly not benefiting from its property status! 
 
Sunstein is another legal scholar who argues for maintaining a non-human animal’s 
property status.77 His argument for keeping this status intact is based firmly on the 
protections provided by our legal system. He states that ‘where it is found that existing 
laws protecting animals are insufficient, an owner’s property rights can then be 
adjusted to counteract these insufficiencies.’78 However, as we have seen above, the 
property paradigm removes any prioritising of animal interests over human interests. 
Whilst Garner’s arguments appear in opposition to Epstein’s and Sunstein’s, he 
ultimately supports maintaining the property status of non-human animals. 
Specifically, Garner states that, whilst he believes abolishing the property status of 
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non-human animals is necessary, he also maintains that significant improvements for 
animals can be achieved from within the existing property paradigm.79 He bases these 
beliefs on the idea that removing the property status of non-human animals is no 
guarantee that they will cease to be exploited.80 Instead he points to necessary changes 
in our current political and ideological climate, rather than changes to the legal status 
of animals, as major factors in protecting non-human animals from exploitation.81  
 
Garner uses the example of animals being significantly better protected in Britain 
compared with the lesser protected animals in the US to demonstrate the irrelevancy 
of property status. Garner bases his premise on the fact that non-human animals are 
considered the property of humans in both countries, yet they experience vastly 
different levels of protection. Notably, Garner holds that it is the political structure and 
social attitudes that exist within those countries which provide better protection for 
non-human animals.82 Garner points to the general reluctance to restrict the property 
rights of humans in the US as a factor contributing to the adoption of less stringent 
animal protection legislation than that which is adopted in Britain.83 Nevertheless, the 
level of protection becomes irrelevant in times of genuine conflict as the interests of 
non-human animals will almost always be subordinated by the human-centeredness of 
the law which puts the interests of the property owner above the interests of the non-
human animal property.84  
 
E Why Non-Human Animals Should Not Be Classified as Property 
1 Property Has Moral Limits  
‘[T]he ultimate fact about property is that it does not really exist: it is mere illusion.’85 
In order to sidestep the unattainable quality inherent in this notion, ‘property’ has 
commonly been conceptualised not as a ‘thing’ but as a ‘bundle of rights.’86 This 
                                                             
79 Robert Garner, ‘Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals’ (2002) 8 Animal Law 77, 78. 
80 Ibid. Garner provides the example of unpossessed (or ‘free’) wild animals to demonstrate that, even 
though they are the property of no one whilst they are free, still do not possess greater rights than those 
which are the property of humans. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid 85. 
83 Ibid 86. 
84 Francione argues that there can never be a ‘genuine conflict’ between the interests of the human and 
the non-human animal as the choice has already been predetermined by the property status of the non-
human animal, i.e. human interests prevail. For further discussion, see Gary Francione, ‘Animals – 
Property or Persons?’ in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds) Animal Rights: Current Debates 
and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004) 108-42. 




‘bundle of rights’ enables humans to claim property in anything they wish, even the 
nothingness of thin air, so long as the resource, as Gray states, is ‘excludable.’87 Gray 
explains that a resource is excludable only when a legal person can exercise control 
over the access by others to the resource’s inherent benefits.88 Obviously, non-human 
animals, under the control of humans, become their property in this way due to the 
‘excludability’ of the animal’s inherent benefits from those who are denied access to 
these benefits. As has been discussed above, this proprietary right is ‘qualified’ when 
it applies to the property status of wild animals, ie they become excludable only when 
a human lawfully captures and/or kills the animal otherwise there is no ‘absolute’ 
proprietary right in the wild animal. Gray identifies the difference between the 
‘propertiness’ of a resource as being ‘represented by a continuum along which varying 
kinds of “property” status may shade finely into each other.’89 Thus, the concept of 
what constitutes ‘property’ is dynamic, not static, and depends largely on the social 
and moral conditions of the time.90 
 
The abolition of human slavery is a pertinent example of how a ‘resource’, ie a human, 
can change from being classified as property to being classified as not property as a 
result of changing social and moral conditions. Gray states that this occurs because 
property is not a ‘value-neutral phenomenon,’ thus property has moral limits whereby 
proprietary rights in a resource stop where the infringement of human rights begin.91 
Therefore, as demonstrated by the history of slavery law, once it was recognised by 
civilised society that classifying (some) humans as property was an infringement of 
those humans’ fundamental freedoms, their property status was then abolished.92 
Hence, the moral limits of human property were reached during the time of slavery, 
resulting in the abolition of what is now commonly considered as the morally 
abhorrent human ownership of other humans. Likewise, if non-human animals were 
granted the same rights as humans (ie not to be owned or used as a resource of another), 
it follows that the moral limits of animal property would also be reached by their 
human ownership and their use as a resource of humans.  
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Francione equates the institution of human slavery with that of animal ownership 
stating that they are ‘structurally identical’ because the slave owner was able to 
disregard the slave’s interests due to their property status, just as animal interests are 
routinely disregarded.93 Francione draws many parallels, the most important being 
that, as chattel or ‘personal’ property, slaves could be bought and sold, willed, insured, 
mortgaged, and seized in payment of the owner’s debts, just as non-human animals are 
today.94 Slave owners could punish their slaves for reasons that benefited the owner, 
just as animal owners are permitted to do under our current laws.95 Those who 
intentionally or negligently injured another’s slave were liable to the owner in an 
action for damage to property, just as they would be if another’s animal was injured.96 
Because of their property status, slaves could not enter into contracts, own property, 
sue or be sued, or live freely; again, just like non-human animals today.97 There were 
laws that ostensibly regulated the use and treatment of slaves, but they, just like our 
animal welfare laws, failed to protect the slave’s interests due to their many 
exemptions and exceptions.98 Hence, the slave owner’s interests always trumped the 
slave’s interests like, as we have seen in our discussions above, human interests always 
trump animal interests. 
 
Therefore, the ownership of non-human animals and human slaves has subjected each 
to ruthless exploitation for many years.99 Although we tolerate varying degrees of 
exploitation, we no longer regard it as legitimate to treat any humans, irrespective of 
their particular characteristics, as the property of others.100 This mainly came about 
because the higher human values of fairness, equality and liberty espoused since 
Roman times could no longer co-exist with the inequity of slavery.101 As Francione 
states, we finally prohibited slavery because we realised that all forms of slavery 
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allowed the interests of the slave to be ignored, particularly their interest in not 
suffering at the hands of their owners for their (the owner’s) benefit, as it is with non-
human animals today.102 Thus slavery failed on all three of the moral grounds that 
humans hold in high regard, ie fairness, equality and liberty, and hence was 
subsequently abolished. Of course there still exists examples of human slavery in the 
world, but it is now considered an action so odious that no civilised nation can bear its 
existence. Thus there are strong prohibitions on all forms of slavery and an outright 
ban on the use of humans as commodities.103 If these prohibitions were extended to 
non-human animals, their exploitation would cease and their ‘property’ status would 
be removed. 
 
2 Non-Human Animals Are More than Inanimate Objects 
As Kelch states, ‘animals are not like inanimate objects . . . Animals feel pain, have 
emotions, give and return love, and some even have characteristics of reason and 
language.’104 It is precisely these features that make an animal significantly different 
from, say, a couch or a car. In some circumstances, the common law has recognised 
this difference and has moved away from the hard-line rule that animals are mere 
property in both its judicial decisions and legislative enactments.105 For instance, 
claims for emotional distress for tortious injury or killing of an animal have found their 
way into the law.106 Also, some courts have moved away from always using a market 
value measure of damages for injuries to and killing of animals, as they would for any 
other type of property.107 For example, in Corso v Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital 
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Inc108 the question involved the proper measure of damages for mishandling the body 
of a dog that was euthanized. In this case, the Court stated that companion animals 
should be seen as occupying a status above that of ordinary property:  
This court now overrules prior precedent and holds that a pet is not just a thing but 
occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal 
property.[A] pet is not an inanimate thing that just receives affection; it also returns it.  
…. 
This decision is not to be construed to include an award for the loss of a family 
heirloom which would also cause great mental anguish. An heirloom while it might 
be the source of good feelings is merely an inanimate object and is not capable of 
returning love and affection. It does not respond to human stimulation; it has no brain 
capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes a human response. Losing the right 
to memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a family picture album is not 
actionable. But a dog - that is something else. To say it is a piece of personal property 
and no more is a repudiation of our humaneness. This I cannot accept.109 
 
The Court in this case held that the plaintiff was entitled to more than market value 
damages for the conduct of the defendant in losing the body of the dog and replacing 
it with a dead cat.110 Thus, some courts are now recognising that non-human animals 
have inherent value and are more than inanimate objects and should be recognised as 
such, along with recognising the special relationship that humans have with non-
human animals.  
 
St Pierre holds that the recognition of this value achieves two ends: first, it 
acknowledges the social significance of the human/non-human animal relationship; 
and second, it questions the property status of non-human animals.111 St Pierre’s ‘ends’ 
are verified in Morgan v Kroupa112 where the plaintiff finder of a dog was awarded 
possession after a year of caring for the animal; a judgement which the dog’s original 
owner appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment that awarded possession 
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of the dog to the finder and not to the original owner. Here, the Vermont Supreme 
Court acknowledged ‘[a companion animal’s] worth is not primarily financial, but 
emotional; its value derives from the animal's relationship with its human companions 
…courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique status.’113 Therefore, 
it is the way humans feel about an animal and their relationship with that animal which 
confirms that non-human animals are more than inanimate objects. Thus, non-human 
animals should no longer be treated in the same way that other inanimate objects are 
treated under law, that is, as the mere property of humans.  
 
3 Equal Consideration: Like Cases Ought to Be Treated Alike  
The principle of equal consideration applies the rule that we ought to treat like cases 
alike, unless there is a good reason not to do so.114 This principle is a necessary 
component of every moral theory, and any moral theory that maintains that it is 
permissible to treat similar cases in a dissimilar way would fail to qualify as an 
acceptable moral theory for that reason alone.115 Francione points to the capacity to 
suffer as the similarity that humans and non-human animals share and thus equal 
consideration should be given to both a human’s and animal’s interest in not suffering, 
unless there is a good reason not to do so.116 However, Francione disregards human 
characteristics as being a necessary pre-requisite for the application of equal 
consideration to non-human animals.117 He states that the ability to recognise oneself 
in a mirror or use symbolic language (ie displaying predominantly human 
characteristics - although some primates do display these traits) is not morally superior 
from the ability to fly unassisted or breathe naturally underwater (ie displaying 
predominantly non-human characteristics) and therefore should not be a factor in 
considering whether or not to apply equal consideration to non-human animals.118 Just 
because humans say these characteristics are better in order to justify their lack of 
consideration of a non-human animal’s interests does not mean that it is true and thus 
should be discounted for that reason.119 
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In practice, equal consideration would follow one of three lines of argument: 1) where 
there is a conflict between human and animal interests, and the human interest weighs 
more, then the animal suffering is justifiable; or 2) where there is no conflict, or if 
there is a conflict but the animal interest weighs more, then we are not justified in using 
the animal; or 3) where there is a conflict, but the human and animal interests are 
weighed similarly, then we should treat those interests in the same way and impose 
suffering on neither or both unless there is some non-arbitrary reason that justifies 
differential treatment.120 Essentially these arguments require that an animal’s interest 
in not suffering be considered when making decisions that affect them. Unfortunately, 
the property status of non-human animals prevents any balancing of interests between 
humans and animals because the interests of the property owner always prevails. Thus, 
in order to apply the principle of equal consideration to non-human animals, their 
property status must be removed. This is exactly what occurred for human slaves when 
their interests were finally recognised as being morally significant, which lead to the 
equal consideration of their interests and the ultimate abolition of slavery. 
 
Sentience is the most often cited reason by animal advocates for abolishing the 
property status and granting non-human animals’ equal consideration of their 
interests.121 Garner holds sentience in such high regard that he claims that non-human 
animals are entitled to be regarded as beneficiaries of justice as a direct result of their 
sentience.122 Francione describes a sentient being as one which uses sensations of pain 
and suffering to escape life threatening situations as well as pursuing sensations of 
pleasure to enhance their lives.123 This definition of sentience noticeably excludes 
other living things such as trees and plants, as well as inanimate objects such as rocks 
and dirt. In the case of inanimate objects, the reason for this exclusion is obvious (they 
cannot be sentient beings because they are incapable of feeling anything), but in the 
case of trees and plants the reasons are not as obvious. On the whole, though, it can be 
safely assumed that trees and plants, although alive, do not escape pain or seek out 
pleasure in the same way that humans and non-human animals do and therefore cannot 
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be considered sentient beings as per the above definition.124 Hence, it is humans and 
non-human animals that display observable behaviours of sentience and so they should 
not be treated as property and their interests should be given equal consideration in 
matters that affect them. A common example used by animal advocates concerns the 
production of animals for food and fibre. They state that an animal’s interest in not 
suffering and experiencing continued life outweighs any human interest of consuming 
and wearing animals for pleasure and taste (animal advocates consider that carnivorous 
diets are not mandatory for human survival), thus factory farming should be 
eliminated.125 However, as mentioned above, for any consideration of an animal’s 
interests to even occur, the property status of non-human animals must first be 
removed so that their interests may be considered equally with human interests. 
 
F Conclusion 
For centuries, non-human animals have been considered to be the property of humans. 
The supremacy of humanity from biblical times, combined with the Roman 
classification of non-human animals as ‘things,’ has endured until today. Even the 
familial inclusion of companion animals has not fundamentally altered their status as 
property. Thus, as with any form of property, there exists a ‘property paradigm’ 
whereby the interests of the property owner almost always prevails over the interests 
of their non-human animal property. Some suggest that there is protection in a 
classification of property as most property owners do not intentionally harm their 
property. This may be true, but only up to the point where human interests are not 
sacrificed or limited. When this occurs, the protections that a non-human animal’s 
property status might provide will be swiftly removed and replaced with human 
justifications for harm. Hence, it is vital that the property status of non-human animals 
be abolished so that they are treated, not as our slaves or in the same way as inanimate 
objects, but as sentient beings with interests that deserve equal consideration with 
human interests.  
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III CHAPTER 2: LEGAL STANDING FOR NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 
A Do Non-Human Animals Have Standing? 
1 No Legal Standing in Their Own Right 
As Cao, Sharman and White suggest, the issue of standing and the legal status of non-
human animals is closely related.126 Since non-human animals are the property of 
humans, they cannot hold legal standing in their own right.127 This is primarily because 
non-human animals are not considered ‘persons’ under law and therefore do not have 
any legal capacity to sue.128 As Wise simply states, ‘[w]ithout legal personhood, one 
is invisible to civil law. One has no civil rights. One might as well be dead.’129 
Therefore, it is up to individuals and animal welfare organisations to bring suit on 
behalf of animals which are in need of protection.130 However, in doing so, these 
human plaintiffs must meet the tests of standing. Under Australian law, standing will 
only be available where the plaintiff has a ‘special interest in the subject matter of the 
action’.131 A special interest is to be distinguished from a ‘mere intellectual belief or 
concern’, which is not considered to be sufficient grounds for standing.132  
 
In most Western countries, to be granted locus standi the plaintiff must have a personal 
stake in the outcome of the case and not merely trying to protect the interests of third 
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parties. This is why the issue of obtaining standing is a significant hurdle for animal 
welfare organisations when filing cases concerning non-human animals.133 For 
example, in Animal Liberation Ltd v Department of Environment and Conservation134 
Hamilton J, of the New South Wales Supreme Court, refused an application for an 
injunction to restrain aerial shooting of goats and pigs on New South Wales nature 
reserves. Justice Hamilton’s refusal was due to the lack of standing of Animal 
Liberation Ltd on the basis that it did not meet the necessary ‘special interest’ test 
under the general principles of standing, along with the fact that there was no sufficient 
evidence of cruelty.135 As a consequence, the current laws force these types of 
plaintiffs to generate bases for standing that are essentially unrelated to the relief 
sought.136 According to Magnotti, this creates a ‘legal fiction’ of the standing alleged 
in these cases, since the injury being pleaded is often not the injury with which the 
parties are typically concerned.137  
 
2 Standing on Behalf of Non-Human Animals 
There are many instances where a person may bring suit on behalf of another who is 
unable to do so themselves. A classic example is where a person acts as a guardian and 
brings suit on behalf of a child or the disabled.138 In these cases, the guardian is not 
required to claim any direct personal injury because the subject of the suit, that is the 
child or the person with the disability, holds their own legal personhood which is 
recognised by the courts.139 In cases involving non-human animals, the person or 
organisation bringing suit on their behalf is similarly trying to represent the animal’s 
interests within a legal setting. However, as we have seen above, non-human animals 
do not hold legal personhood and thus their human representatives must instead plead 
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an injury to themselves that is independent from the injury to the animal in order to be 
granted standing.140  
 
Bryant therefore asks an obvious question, ‘if animals are the intended beneficiaries 
of laws that purport to protect them and it is animals themselves who are harmed when 
those laws are violated, why should a human have to show harm derived from the harm 
done to an animal?’141 According to Bryant, when seeking to address the harm to a 
non-human animal, ‘it makes more procedural sense to have the lawyer directly 
represent the harmed animal than have them represent the human that has been harmed 
from another human’s failure to prevent harm to the animal.’142 Bryant’s assertion 
does not discount the fact that the human may have indeed suffered harm, rather it 
emphasises that their injuries are distinguishable from that of the non-human animal’s, 
and thus they should both be granted standing in recognition of their respective 
injuries.143  
 
Fortunately for animals, the detriment suffered by the plaintiff human need not be 
significant to grant standing, as was found in Animal Legal Defence Fund Inc. v 
Glickman.144 In this case, the US Court of Appeal granted standing to sue on behalf of 
mistreated apes held at the Long Island Game Farm Park and Zoo. Here, standing was 
granted because the human plaintiff had suffered personal distress and aesthetic and 
emotional injury as a result of witnessing the apes’ inhumane treatment.145 It is claimed 
by some that Glickman represents a ‘small window for standing’146 while others 
recommend caution against making claims that the ruling has any effect in promoting 
the interests of non-human animals.147 Those who argue the latter invariably hold that, 
in order to overcome this limitation, the law should expand the standing doctrine to 
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recognise the interests of non-human animals, just as it does for other non-human 
entities.148 
 
B Standing for Artificial Persons 
The issue of whether a non-human, or artificial, entity can be considered a ‘person’ for 
the purposes of granting standing is not new to the courts as there has been heated 
debate over this controversy for centuries.149 Teubner notes that the invention of the 
legal person was ‘law’s great cultural contribution to the organizational revolution in 
which attribution of action was expanded beyond natural people.’150 The judiciary and 
legislature have long recognised artificial entities as ‘persons,’ the most common being 
the corporation. Some less common examples of Australian courts granting standing 
to artificial persons include a union151 and an unincorporated Jewish Association.152 
Thus, there are now a wide variety of non-human entities that have been granted the 
same rights and duties of human entities, without there being the requisite requirement 
of ‘humanness’ in order to be classified as a legal ‘person.’ 
 
Therefore, as White notes, the question then becomes: ‘[i]f ships, corporations and 
children are able to have actions brought on their behalf to secure their rights, then 
why not animals?’153 The underlying premise of this question was supported in obiter 
in a case in the US concerning whether dolphins and whales have standing. In this 
case, the Court noted that it saw nothing to prevent the legislature:  
…authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought 
in the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even 
ships, or of juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, and mental 
incompetents.154  
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Hence, it appears that a logical conclusion which may be drawn from precedent is that 
standing should be granted to the injured party, no matter if that party is either a human 
or non-human entity.155 However, it is unlikely that logic will prevail where non-
human animals are concerned, especially since their status as property makes them 
almost invisible to the courts. 
 
C Conclusion 
At present, non-human animals are not recognised by the courts as having locus standi. 
Their current property status prevents them from being granted legal standing because 
they are not classified as ‘persons’ under law. Only legal ‘persons’ may sue, hence it 
is up to humans to prove they have a ‘special interest’ in a case that concerns non-
human animals. Where they can achieve this, they will be granted sufficient standing 
to be able to sue on the non-human animal’s behalf. This is very ineffective as the 
injured party, ie the non-human animal, can only get their harm addressed in court by 
indirect means and thus their claim becomes secondary to the claim of the human 
plaintiff. In order to be more effective, the standing doctrine should be extended to 
include non-human animals so they may sue in their own right. This is certainly 
possible, especially considering that the courts have long recognised other non-human 
entities, such as corporations and ships, as legal ‘persons.’ Thus, it is up to the courts 
to do as they have done for other non-human entities and recognise non-human animals 
as legal ‘persons’ so that they may sue in their own right. 
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IV CHAPTER 3: LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR NON-HUMAN 
ANIMALS 
A Legal Personhood Defined 
Bryant proposes two definitions of legal personhood which encompass both a broad 
and narrow approach.156 The broad approach describes legal personhood as the ‘legal 
recognition of the extent to which animals should be considered “persons” entitled to 
inclusion in the moral community such that humans cannot commit acts on animals 
that humans cannot commit on equally situated humans.’157 Bryant is critical of this 
broad approach as it requires the ‘endless, fruitless proofs that animals bear such 
substantial similarity to humans.’158 For example, in order to be granted standing, 
which is integral to the rights of a legal ‘person,’ non-human animals must first pass 
the test of ‘humanness.’ Bryant believes that this requirement will only gain admission 
for a few select non-human animals, such as primates (apes) and cetacean (dolphins) 
and exclude all other non-human animals from protecting their interests in their own 
right.159 She also believes this broad approach will reinforce the hierarchy between 
humans and non-human animals and serve to oppress other animal species that have 
not gained entrance to the moral community.160 Additionally, Bryant believes that 
‘such a broad approach will inevitably fail because humans are too heavily invested in 
defining themselves as different from, or in opposition to, non-human animals,’ as well 
as ‘using and consuming animals to meet their own needs’ with little or no 
consideration for the needs of the non-human animal.161  
 
Bryant is not alone in her criticisms of the broad approach to legal personhood. David 
Cassuto, a Pace University Law Professor who specialises in environmental and 
animal law, claims that, ‘[t]o date, no quintessentially “human” characteristic has 
emerged to definitively set humans apart from other animals… [and therefore] biology 
is a thin reed on which to hang one’s humanity and claim to personhood.’162 Moreover, 
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when granting legal personhood to non-human animals, Cassuto believes that the 
broad approach is flawed, because ‘[r]egardless of how wide its scope, personhood 
will always define itself through contrast with an excluded other.’163 As long as non-
human animals are considered anything ‘other’ than ‘human,’ legal personhood will 
unlikely be granted to them. Hence, any inclusion into the ‘personhood realm’ for non-
human animals will be dependent upon whether the essence of their being sufficiently 
resembles our own, placing unjustified and unrealistic requirements on animals.164 
Therefore, Cassuto, like Bryant, contends that the umbrella or broad definition of legal 
personhood based on the ‘similarity to humans’ argument has its inherent limitations.  
 
For these reasons, Bryant’s narrow approach to legal personhood provides a more 
achievable model for non-human animals. This approach focuses on granting legal 
standing for the ‘aggrieved person,’ whether that be a human or non-human animal.165 
Bryant contends that pursuing ‘legal personhood in the form of legal standing [for non-
human animals] need not result in the same attempted, fruitless proofs of animals’ 
similarity to humans’ when they are recognised as plaintiffs in their own right.166 
However, Bryant qualifies this statement by noting that the narrow definition of legal 
personhood (which really equates to legal standing for animals) has ‘conceptual and 
instrumental meaning only if it interrupts the feedback loop between ideas of the 
superiority and entitlement of humans and the manifestation of those ideas in the legal 
status of animals as property.’167 Considering the current situation concerning the use 
of animals, particularly the consumption of ‘food’ animals, interrupting this ‘feedback 
loop’ appears unlikely due to the fact that humans are using and consuming more 
animals than ever before in human history.168 However, as Bryant explains, it really 
does not appear to matter much what definition is applied since:  
[t]he idea of ‘legal personhood’ has considerable gravitational pull as a means for 
protecting animals because, regardless of the particular theory of legal personhood, 
the combination of words, at least, implies respect for animals as individuals who 
should receive more protection under the law than they currently receive.169 
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B Theories of Legal Personhood 
1 Habeas Corpus for Non-Human Animals 
Wise recommends that non-human animals can be recognised as 'persons' through a 
writ of habeas corpus. Wise states that a writ of habeas corpus has the effect of 
releasing a ‘prisoner’ from ‘unlawful detention,’ which includes any detention that 
lacks sufficient cause or evidence.170 As Wise explains, non-human animals are able 
to access a writ of habeas corpus even though they have no legal capacity to sue.171 
This is mainly due to the ‘unusual nature’ of the writ in that the beneficiary of the writ 
need no power to bring suit themselves.172 All that is required is for concerned citizens 
to seek out a writ to be issued on behalf of the unlawfully detained animal.173 Wise 
uses the famous 1772 English slavery case of Somerset v Stewart174 as analogous to 
the method by which a writ of habeas corpus may be applied in the case of the unlawful 
detention of a non-human animal. In the Somerset case, Lord Mansfield granted a writ 
of habeas corpus to free James Somerset (an African male) from unlawful detention as 
a slave in England. In more current times, petitions for writs concerning unlawfully 
detained animals have been lodged. For example, on 8 October 2014, the Nonhuman 
Rights Project (founded by Wise) gave oral argument in the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 26 year old 
chimpanzee ‘Tommy’ who the lawyers state is wrongfully imprisoned in a ‘shed’ in 
Gloversville, New York. The Court is expected to make its decision in mid-November 
2014.175 Thus, a writ of habeas corpus may be a means by which non-human animals 
are granted freedoms similar to those of humans’ regardless of the fact that they do not 
possess the requisite power to sue in their own right. 
 
2 Guardianship 
Guardianship is considered a moderate way to alter the property status of animals so 
that they are no longer considered a ‘thing’ that is subject to human ownership.176 This 
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change in nomenclature is becoming more popular in Western cultures, particularly in 
the case of companion animals.177 For example, in some jurisdictions in the US such 
as the State of Rhode Island and the cities of Boulder and San Francisco (to name only 
a few) companion animals are no longer considered ‘property’ and the people who 
were once their ‘owners’ are now their ‘guardians.’178 It is believed by some that the 
movement from human ownership of animals to something like guardianship will 
continue to grow with regard to companion animals.179 This may be lucky for (some) 
companion animals, but not so lucky for all other animals that are owned and used by 
humans. For instance, it is unlikely that farmers would adopt such terminology and 
consider themselves ‘guardians’ as opposed to ‘owners’ of their livestock, especially 
considering the possible limitations that may be placed on their farming practices. 
However, according to Fagundes, farmers need not be too concerned as this change in 
nomenclature does not provide animals with any more rights or impose on guardians 
any more obligations than existed under previous law.180 Fagundes holds that such 
changes in nomenclature may alter the perception of animals, but is equally sceptical 
that these changes will have much effect on their actual treatment.181 He does concede 
though that changing the perception of non-human animals is ‘a step in the right 
direction, if only a marginal one.’182  
 
3 Equitable Self-Ownership 
Favre’s equitable self-ownership model is based on a trust-like relationship between 
humans and non-human animals. The basis of his model is founded in the human (or 
human substitute, such as a corporation or a government) holding legal title to the 
animal and the animal holding equitable title in itself; creating an ‘equitably self-
owned animal.’183 Favre is a proponent of non-human animals’ property status, hence 
his model does not seek to remove this status. Rather it creates a new legal personality 
                                                             
177 Bernard Rollin, ‘Animal Ethics and Legal Status’ in Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman and Matthew 
Kamen (eds) People, Property, or Pets? (Purdue University Press, 2006) 38.  
178 Ibid 37.  
179 Ibid 38. 
180 Dave Fagundes, ‘The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals’ PrawfsBlawg, February 18, 2006 
<http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/02/the_legal_statu.html>. 
181 Ibid (emphasis added). Indeed, there have been no reported cases challenging the proper guardianship 
of an animal in the 10 years that the State of Rhode Island has held these laws. See Gary Block, 
‘Guardianship Revisited: Rhode Island Law Passes 10-Year Mark’ Humane Society Veterinary Medical 
Association, October 11, 2011 < http://www.hsvma.org/guardianship_rilaw#.U-whaGOkkn0>. 
182 Fagundes, above n 180. 
183 David Favre, ‘Equitable Self-ownership for Animals’ (2000) 50 Duke Law Journal 473. 
32 
 
that sits ‘between being only property and being freed of property status.’184 This 
‘intermediate’ status has the effect of recognising a non-human animal’s interests 
within the legal system without fully abandoning their property status.185 Favre 
contends that legal history supports the notion that equitable title can be separated from 
legal title, and thus, by transferring the equitable title to the animal itself, it is then 
possible to change the animal’s personhood status because it would be ‘self-owned.’186 
Therefore, if a non-human animal has ‘self-owned’ status, it could be treated as a legal 
‘person’ with legally-recognised interests including, inter alia, the ownership of 
property and tort law remedies.187 Favre admits that the critical hurdle for acceptance 
of this new status is the perceptions and beliefs of individuals; those who believe non-
human animals are worthy of consideration in our moral and legal universe will readily 
accept self-ownership for animals and those who do not, will not.188  
 
4 Citizenship for Animals 
Kymlicka and Donaldson manifest legal personhood for non-human animals through 
the notion of citizenship.189 Granting citizenship to animals is a novel concept and, to 
some, offers a more plausible alternative to traditional animal rights theories.190 
Kymlicka and Donaldson apply their citizenship model to domesticated animals only, 
with no other animals, such as wild animals or what they refer to as ‘liminal animals’ 
(wild animals living among us) being eligible.191 They differentiate between animals 
depending on the relationships humans have with these animals. For example, they 
compare our relationship with wild wolves and domesticated dogs, and hold that since 
we have brought dogs into our society through domestication, bred them to become 
dependent on us, and incorporated them into our schemes of social co-operation, we 
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have created obligations to dogs that differ from those to wolves, despite their 
commonalities.192 Thus, Kymlicka and Donaldson believe that ‘domesticated animals 
should be viewed as members of a shared society with us, and hence as having rights 
of membership’ through citizenship.193 The authors do address our obligations toward 
other animals such as wild animals, by granting rights to their own territory through 
sovereignty, and liminal animals, by granting rights of residency without human 
interference through denizenship, but their main focus is on granting citizenship to 
those non-human animals we have domesticated, such as farm animals, animals in 
research laboratories, companion animals and service animals.194 
 
As Kymlicka and Donaldson explain, citizenship is typically understood to involve a 
bundle of rights and responsibilities.195 The rights of citizenship include rights of 
residency; rights to protection;196 rights to health (veterinary) care; labour rights;197 
and the right to have one’s interests taken into account in determining the common 
good, and in shaping the rules that govern our shared society and activities.198 The 
responsibilities of citizenship include a duty of civility toward co-citizens and a duty 
of contribution.199 The authors do not see a problem with fulfilling either of these 
duties when it comes to domesticated animals especially since most are already 
socialised and contribute in a significant way to human society.200 The obvious 
contention with these duties, as the authors acknowledge, is that such socialisation can 
be inherently oppressive for the domesticated animal, especially by restricting their 
natural behaviours for the convenience of humans, and animal labour can be 
exploitative.201 Whilst this may be so, without civility and contribution there is no 
‘shared society’ and no possibility for just relations between humans and domesticated 
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animals.202 Thus, a meaningful and successful relationship of co-citizenship would 
depend heavily on the good will of humans.203 Unfortunately, the self-interest that 
humans display when it comes to exploiting and using non-human animals makes the 
likelihood of citizenship working in our current society doubtful. 
 
5 Autonomy Equals Personhood 
Wise contends that legal personhood applies only to those beings considered to be 
'autonomous.'204 Wise uses the term ‘practical autonomy’ to describe the characteristic 
required to be deemed a legal ‘person’ under law.205 According to Wise, practical 
autonomy has three elements: 1) cognitive complexity significant enough to have the 
ability to want something; 2) intentional actions which result in achieving one’s 
desires; and 3) a sense of self complex enough so that it matters whether one achieves 
one’s own goals.206 At the heart of practical autonomy lies sentience and 
consciousness; without these one cannot be autonomous.207 In order to afford legal 
personhood to animals, Wise has developed a scale of practical autonomy whereby the 
level of autonomy varies for different animals depending on their level of sentience 
and consciousness and similarity to humans.208 For example, chimpanzees would 
possess a higher level of practical autonomy because they display more conscious 
behaviours that are more like ours. Thus, according to Wise, ‘the basic liberty and 
equality rights of non-human animals should be recognised dependant on the level of 
autonomy possessed.’209 Wise’s focus on autonomy is driven by the fact that common 
law judges recognise autonomy as a sufficient condition for legal personhood.210 
However, there is disagreement amongst commentators as to whether non-human 
animals are in fact autonomous211 Therefore, due to this disagreement, Wise’s scale of 
practical autonomy is at risk of becoming a meaningless measure of personhood and, 
hence, little help when promoting non-human animal interests. 
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C Criticisms of Legal Personhood 
1 ‘Mere tinkering’ with Property Status 
Bryant argues that legal personhood for non-human animals ‘cannot be pursued 
without addressing the status of animals as property’ and that ‘[m]ere tinkering’ with 
this status does nothing to ultimately improve the lives of non-human animals.212 
Bryant explains that tinkering with a non-human animal’s property status effectively 
leaves this status intact which inevitably provides humans with a trump card that they 
may use any time human and non-human animal interests’ conflict.213 To demonstrate 
Bryant’s point, Francione provides an example where, if the rules of a slave owner 
were changed from allowing them to whip their slave three times a week rather than 
five times a week, this would be ‘tinkering at the edges’ of the owner’s permissible 
use of their slave without having any effect on the property status of the slave.214 Thus, 
because the slave remains the property of the owner, this ‘tinkering’ does nothing to 
recognise their moral or ‘personhood’ status; they are simply being whipped less. 
Nevertheless, both Francione and Bryant, amongst other scholars,215 understand this 
inclination to ‘tinker’ since a wholesale elimination of the property status of non-
human animals is far too radical a proposition to contemplate in today’s animal-
dependant world.216 Therefore, it has been suggested that taking incremental steps 
towards achieving legal personhood status is the preferred approach, as opposed to 
merely altering or ‘tinkering’ with the current property status of non-human animals.217  
 
2 The Abolitionist Agenda 
Francione identifies himself as an ‘abolitionist’ who maintains that the guiding 
principle for both humans and non-human animals is that they hold the fundamental 
right not to be treated as the property of others.218 Thus, Francione believes that 
theories of legal personhood, such as guardianship and equitable self-ownership, are 
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‘ridiculous’ because, as he states, ‘[t]he bottom line is that those humans are still 
owners no matter what you call them. These “guardians” can still have their healthy 
animals “put down” (ie killed) or can dump them at a shelter.’219 Bryant holds similar 
criticisms, particularly of Favre’s concept of equitable self-ownership for non-human 
animals. Bryant states that, because Favre’s theory does nothing to abolish a non-
human animal’s status as property, it is difficult to see how it would incrementally 
improve their situation because a court would always rule in favour of human interests, 
with the exception of situations of purposeless infliction of harm on animals.220 
Therefore, as the vast majority of harms inflicted on non-human animals can be 
justified by owners by reason of producing food and medicine, it is unlikely that any 
improvement in the treatment of animals will be achieved from ascribing a guardian-
like relationship between the parties.221 
 
3 Human Rights vs Non-Human Animal Rights 
Schmahmann and Polacheck are opposed to any form of legal personhood, or, more 
specifically, ‘rights’ for non-human animals. They argue that if non-human animals 
became bearers of rights, then human rights would suffer.222 They base their argument 
on their belief that, if there was no hierarchy between animals and humans, the rights 
of the individual animal would compete with the rights of the individual human.223 
When the authors contemplate a world where there is no hierarchy, they envision a 
vast, bureaucratic and intrusive structure, specifically led by the government. This 
structure would put non-human animals’ interests above humans, effectively 
restricting and erecting barriers to human conduct based on animal interests. Thus, as 
the authors note, ‘no rat could be harmed, chicken cooked, or rabbit dissected without 
government permission or the prospect of government scrutiny.’224 The authors make 
it clear that it is human interests that are the true measure of things, and ‘not any 
supposed interest in an anthropomorphized rat or a Disneyfied rabbit.’225 The fact that 
there is legislation that exists which protects non-human animals from gratuitous 
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mistreatment and cruelty is sufficient for Schmahmann and Polacheck.226 They state 
that, even though this legislation balances human interests, humans still have a 
responsibility to treat non-human animals humanely, and thus it is not necessary to 
give non-human animals the same ‘rights’ as humans through legal personhood.227  
 
The subject of ‘competing rights’ between non-human animals and humans is a non-
issue for some commentators. Cohen is one such commentator who strongly asserts 
that there is no competition for rights because non-human animals are incapable of 
having rights. He states that ‘[a]nimals cannot be the bearers of rights because the 
concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human 
moral world.’ 228 In a debate on the issue of non-human animal rights with the well-
known animal rights advocate Tom Regan, Cohen states that he believes humans have 
many obligations to animals, such as acting humanely toward them and not subjecting 
them to unnecessary pain. However, this does not mean, in his view, that non-human 
animals consequently possess rights in reciprocation of these obligations.229 Cohen 
states that if non-human animals did have rights then they must be respected, even at 
great expense to humans.230  
 
However, Cohen’s arguments, as is correctly pointed out by Regan in his reply, are 
based mostly on the drastic consequences of not using animals in medical research 
with little or no consideration for other animal use such as for food or fibre.231 Hence, 
his arguments against rights for non-human animals are limited to the most difficult 
choices, where animal use in experiments may be warranted in very special, and rare, 
circumstances. Nevertheless, Cohen’s conclusions are correct in that non-human 
animals do not possess any rights; not necessarily because they are not ‘human,’ but 
more because their property status precludes it. Put simply, ‘things cannot have 
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rights.’232 Thus, the achievement of rights for non-human animals is impossible, and 
any talk of it ‘senseless,’ so long as they remain the property of humans.233 
 
4 A Feminist Critique of Legal Personhood 
In direct criticism of Wise’s theory of ‘practical autonomy,’ MacKinnon states that 
‘[i]f qualified entrance into the human race on male terms has done little for 
women…how much will being seen as humanlike, but not fully so, do for other 
animals?’234 MacKinnon acknowledges that ‘possessing some rights is better than 
possessing none,’ however, in her view, ‘the articulation of formal rights may result in 
little substantive change to the treatment and status of non-human animals, and 
ultimately be an exercise in futility.’235 Freshman - although not writing from a strictly 
feminist perspective - uses parallels from other rights movements, such as those 
promoting equality for African-Americans, to demonstrate that little substantive 
change has occurred in terms of better education, wealth and income for many blacks 
even after their granting of formal equal rights.236 
 
MacKinnon uses the example of granting more rights to women to explain why 
granting legal personhood may not result in any better treatment for non-human 
animals. She states that even though women have rights per se, in their present form 
they have done ‘precious little to change the abuse that is inflicted on women daily.’237 
Additionally, as MacKinnon states, these ‘rights’ do little to alter the inferior status of 
women which makes the abuse possible.238 This is analogous with non-human animals 
who have ‘rights’ codified in anti-cruelty legislation, however, the exemptions set out 
in this legislation ensure that the majority of non-human animals, mostly those in the 
research and agricultural sectors, are subject to cruel and inhumane practices.239 As it 
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is with women, non-human animals have long been referred to as inferior and placed 
at the bottom of the hierarchy. Put bluntly, ‘[p]eople dominate animals, men dominate 
women.’240 Therefore, without a significant shift in the perception of non-human 
animals, granting them legal personhood would do little to raise their status or improve 
their treatment. 
 
5 ‘Personhood’ is an Inappropriate Lexis for Non-Human Animals 
Some commentators believe that classifying non-human animals as ‘persons’ is 
philosophically and ethically inappropriate as the use of the term ‘person’ reinstates 
human superiority over non-human animals.241 In addressing this issue, one 
commentator has developed a new category of property whilst another has developed 
a new category outside of property and personhood. Favre’s new category of property 
involves classifying non-human animals as ‘living property’ where their interests are 
recognised and protected under law, but they retain their property status.242 This new 
category has been criticised for compounding the problem of the use and abuse of non-
human animals by further instilling the idea of animals as ‘property.’243 Therefore, 
labelling non-human animals as ‘living property’ does little to progress their legal 
personhood status. 
 
A new category which does not identify animals as either property or persons is what 
Wolfe has describes as ‘[t]he most realistic and simple category [of] “animals.”’244 
Wolfe explains that, under this category, non-human animals ‘would then be subject 
to their own set of laws – independent of those that apply to “property” or to 
“humans.”’245 Wolfe holds that by categorising animals as ‘animals’ rather than 
‘property’ this will result in the awarding of non-economic damages for their owners, 
and (she hopes) promote more respect for non-human animals as living creatures.  
However, upon review, Wolfe’s category of ‘animal’ does not differ greatly from 
Bryant’s narrow definition of personhood (ie legal standing for non-human animals), 
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thus it appears this change in terminology is merely superficial. Therefore, despite 
claims of the inappropriate lexis of personhood, it matters little which term is used so 
long as non-human animals are not classified as property under law.  
 
D Conclusion 
Personhood for non-human animals refers to their inclusion into our moral community 
and being granted legal standing and rights equal to those of humans. Various legal 
professors and philosophers have developed theories that promote different forms of 
legal personhood for non-human animals. Some of these theories have been criticised 
as mere ‘tinkering’ with the property status of non-human animals and hence not 
achieving legal personhood at all. This is particularly so in relation to those theories 
that require a non-human animal to possess human qualities before they can qualify as 
a legal ‘person.’ Some critics of legal personhood are outright opposed to granting 
rights to non-human animals, while others go so far as to declare animals incapable of 
having any rights whatsoever. Some feminists hold that even if non-human animals 
were granted legal personhood, its practical application would do little to promote their 
interests, just as granting women more rights has done little to prevent women’s abuse. 
Hence, there is much debate as to what legal personhood looks like for non-human 
animals and whether they should be granted it at all. However, legal personhood is a 
vital requirement when asserting the right not to be used as the resource of another; a 
requirement that non-human animals ultimately need if changes to their current status 
are to occur. Therefore, being classified as a ‘person,’ as opposed to ‘property’ under 
law, will enable non-human animals to claim the fundamental right not to be used as a 




V CHAPTER 4: MAKING THE TRANSITION TO LEGAL 
PERSONHOOD 
A Is Legal Personhood Attainable for Non-Human Animals? 
1 Flexibility of the Common Law  
From our previous discussion on the history of an animal’s property status it is more 
than evident that the common law has, for at least the last 200 years, effectively 
prioritised the rights of humans, as property owners, above those of non-human 
animals. But, as Kelch reasonably states, ‘the common law is not an impotent steed 
fenced by history; it has the liberty and, in fact, the duty to migrate to higher ground 
when facts and moral awareness dictate.’246 Thus the common law is a ‘ripe 
mechanism’ for changing the legal status of non-human animals as property, especially 
since previous legislative efforts to protect their interests have been largely 
ineffective.247 Indeed, the common law is not meant to be rigid, but instead should be 
flexible so that it may evolve over time.248 An early example of this flexibility was 
evident in the ruling of the infamous Oppenheim249 case heard in the US. In this case 
the Court allowed a wife to make a claim for criminal conversation, an action 
previously denied a woman under the common law.250 Hence, it is now widely 
accepted in common law jurisdictions that the law must be flexible and adaptable in 
order to keep pace with societal change.251 
 
The basis for change in the common law has been identified by Professors Atiyah and 
Summers and summarised on three main grounds: 1) where changes in circumstances 
occur so that precedent becomes substantively obsolete; 2) where growing moral and 
social enlightenment shows that the substantive values underlying the law are no 
longer acceptable; or 3) where the precedent was substantively erroneous or badly 
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conceived from the beginning.252 With reference to the first cause, changes in 
circumstances might include gradual changes in similar laws over the years, or a 
change in relationships between, for example, a husband and a wife, or within the 
family unit or between an employer and employee within the employment relationship; 
resulting in changes in the common law which reflect these new circumstances.253 The 
second cause concerns the changes in societal values which are usually reflected in 
public policy. An obvious example is the changing role of women in society which has 
resulted in frequent and ongoing changes in the common law primarily through the 
extension of more and more rights to women.254 As Kelch explains, ‘when the moral 
and social reasons for a rule have been rejected by society, so should the rule.’255 The 
third cause is self-explanatory and so it is a logical, and sometimes expected 
occurrence when these erroneous or badly conceived precedents become the subject 
of modification. 
 
As one would expect, these causes are not distinct entities and thus they overlap with 
one another in effecting change in the common law.256 For example, there have been 
many changes in the world from the time when non-human animals were first 
considered to be the property of humans thousands of years ago. Some of the ancient 
laws have remained the same (ie animals remain the property of humans), but some 
have changed (ie despite what Descartes held, animals do in fact feel pain so they must 
be protected against ‘unnecessary’ suffering). The basis for these changes are three-
fold: the first is based on a change in circumstances (cause one) such as an increase in 
scientific knowledge about animals; the second is based on a change in societal values 
(cause two) such as society’s view on the appropriate treatment of animals; the third 
is, as Kelch explains, based on the erroneous idea that animals are mere property (cause 
three) which is founded on concepts that modern science has disproved, such as the 
fact that they are more like us than not.257 Therefore, in reference to the treatment of 
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non-human animals, the common law has adapted its laws to reflect the change in 
circumstances, particularly from the scientific realm, and the change in society’s 
expectations of how non-human animals should be treated; thus proving its inherent 
flexibility to adapt and change with the times. Hence, there is no conceivable or 
compelling reason, in terms of the laws ability, why legal personhood would not be 
attainable for non-human animals. 
 
2 Legal Personhood for Non-Human Entities 
In her article, Huss makes the claim that ‘it is possible to change the legal personhood 
status of non-human animals, just as it has been possible to change the status of other 
non-human entities such as corporations, ships, universities, government agencies and 
cities.’258 In support of this claim, Huss, when interviewed before the ruling of the case 
concerning People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Sea World,259 
made the comment that ‘no one's [sic] established that animals are legal persons. It 
doesn't mean we couldn't ... it's just something that we as a society have not decided 
to do yet. If we can establish corporations as persons, why can't we establish whales 
as persons?’260 Wise agrees and suggests that because the common law is exceedingly 
flexible and has the ability to recognise ‘things’ as ‘legal persons,’ there is no reason 
why animals cannot be afforded the same treatment.261 Indeed, the law is flexible 
enough to speak of a non-human entity, such as a corporation, as a ‘legal person’ and 
has done so for many years.262 This artificial entity is a ‘legal person’ which is the 
subject of rights and duties, capable of owning real property, entering into contracts, 
and suing and being sued in its own name; actions currently unavailable to non-human 
animals.263  
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As already mentioned, there has been heated debate for centuries between 
philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, jurists and judges as to what 
constitutes the ‘essence’ of this ‘soulless and bodiless person.’264 However, as Iwai 
explains, this debate has been, on the whole, declared ‘dead’ mostly as a result of John 
Dewey’s article published in 1926.265 In his article, Dewey succinctly states that 
‘“person” signifies what law makes it signify.’266 This simple, but effective statement 
literally ended the century old debate on what constitutes a ‘person’ under law. Quite 
rightly too as it is well understood that the law has the flexibility, along with the 
authority, to create legal fictions such as corporate persons.267 In his article, Dewey 
went as far as actually dismissing the debate of what constitutes a ‘person’ as pointless, 
calling it a ‘confusion’ brought about by an unwarranted assumption that ‘there is in 
existence some single and coherent theory of personality and will, singular or 
associated.’268 Therefore, because there is no one single theory of personality, non-
human entities are able to be classified as legal persons under law. 
 
As a starting point in his discussion of legal personhood, Dewey indicated that the 
juridical term ‘person’ might be used simply as a synonym for a ‘right-and-duty-
bearing unit.’269 He states that this unit, be it human or non-human, might be called a 
‘person’ without any implications, except that the unit has those rights and duties 
which the courts find it to have.270 Whatever the term ‘person’ signifies in popular 
speech, or in psychology, or in philosophy or morals, is irrelevant. Just as irrelevant as 
it would be to argue that just because a wine is called ‘dry’ it has the properties of dry 
solids; or that, because it does not have those properties, wine cannot possibly be 
‘dry.’271 As Dewey explains, the term ‘dry’ as applied to a particular wine ‘has the 
kind of meaning, and only the kind of meaning, which it has when applied to the class 
of beverages in general.’272 This argument holds true for the use of the term ‘person’ 
under law. To be classified as a legal person ‘humanness’ is not required, just as dry 
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solids are not required for a wine to be ‘dry.’ Rather, the requirement of legal 
personhood is that the ‘person’ be the possessor of rights and bearer of duties at law.  
 
Dewey states that because a legal person is a ‘right-and-duty-bearing unit,’ objects 
such as molecules, trees, or tables, cannot qualify as ‘persons’ under law. This is 
because, as Dewey explains, these objects are incapable of having ‘mutual relations’ 
with others which underlie the foundations of the rights and duties of the legal 
person.273 He states that these ‘mutual relations’ lead to social consequences which are 
controlled and modified by the beings that are the bearers of rights and duties.274 
Dewey admits that ‘[m]olecules and trees certainly have social consequences; but 
these consequences are what they are irrespective of having rights and duties. [They] 
would continue to behave exactly as they do whether or not rights and duties were 
ascribed to them.’275 This sentiment is evident in environmental jurisprudence where 
it is typical for the promotion of legal rights to be ascribed to the environment, but not 
legal personhood, as the corresponding legal obligations are missing along with the 
ability for ‘mutual relations.’ As Christopher Stone points out in his highly influential 
article, it would take a ‘bold and imaginative lawyer’ to convince a court that an 
endangered river was a ‘person.’ 276  
 
Non-human animals, however, are different in the sense that they are beings with the 
ability to have ‘mutual relations’ with other beings, be they human or other non-human 
animals, that lead to changing social consequences. For example, if non-human 
animals were ascribed the right not to be treated in a way that caused them pain and 
suffering for any reason (except where it was for the good of the animal in the case of 
emergency veterinary surgery), the social consequences would be significant in terms 
of the effect this would have on the viability of the agricultural, entertainment, and 
biomedical sectors; not to mention the changing relationship humans would have with 
non-human animals within these sectors, including the domestic environment (if 
animals existed in these environments at all!). Ascribing such rights to animals would 
significantly impact our ‘mutual relations’ resulting in a vastly different relationship 
between humans and non-human animals than the one that currently exists today. 
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It is important to note here that if non-human animals were classified as ‘persons’ it 
does not mean that they are the same as human persons or that they will have exactly 
the same rights as humans or, for that matter, the same rights as other non-human 
entities; rather they will be the possessors of rights that relate specifically to them.277 
Similarly, non-human animals will not bear the same duties as humans (or other non-
human entities) as their duties will be specifically relevant to them.278 This may work 
in a comparable way to how children and the disabled are treated under law. For 
instance, even though children and the disabled belong to the human species, they do 
not bear the same duties and obligations under law as fully competent adult humans.279 
This is because law requires of them exactly what their competencies allow. Therefore, 
following along the lines of Dewey’s argument that ‘“person” signifies what law 
makes it signify,’ if the law decided to grant rights and impose duties on non-human 
animals then they could conceivably be declared ‘persons’ under law.  
 
B Legal Requirements to Make the Transition 
1 Enlightened Judicial Decision-Making  
Judges are usually precedent bound, although, as we have seen above, the common 
law is flexible enough to overcome this restriction where there is sufficient cause. 
According to Wise, sufficient cause includes acknowledging the scientific 
discreditation of the ‘vertical cosmologies’ that created the ‘legal thinghood’ of non-
human animals throughout our past history.280 The ruin of these beliefs has opened the 
possibility for judges to consider that non-human animals might transcend ‘legal 
thinghood’ as a matter of logic and normative principles; both essential elements in 
judicial decision-making.281 As Lord Atkin proclaimed in United Australia Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd282 ‘[w]hen these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice 
clanking their mediaeval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them 
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undeterred.’ Therefore, once an injustice has been brought to the attention of a judge, 
it is their duty to ensure that, in light of what they believe to be true facts and modern 
values, the rules are changed so that justice can be achieved in each case.283 Thus, 
judges are required to look beyond the arbitrary rules of the past and incorporate 
modern science and knowledge, along with the changing values of society, into their 
decision-making.  
 
Dismantling thousands of years of legal rules that have upheld the property status of 
non-human animals will not be an easy task. Indeed, it will most likely be a long and 
difficult struggle, but as Wise contends, ‘[i]t is the nature of great change to stimulate 
great opposition.’284 The question, then, is which judges will be fit for the challenge? 
More specifically, ‘[w]hich judges are likely to be the most intellectually and 
emotionally able and willing to see that it is possible and appropriate to extend dignity-
rights beyond nonhuman beings, to think deeply about and understand this possibility, 
and to change their beliefs?’285 Wise believes it is those judges who best understand 
and believe the basic principles of modern Darwinian evolution and ecology and who 
have the least personal or social investment in the wholesale exploitation of non-
human animals.286 He also believes it will be those judges who are the least saturated 
with critical arguments against the notion of non-human animals having the same 
rights as humans, along with those who are the most strongly motivated to examine 
the data that supports a transition to legal personhood for non-human animals.287  
 
The conservative nature of the judiciary makes it more difficult to find such judges, 
but they do exist, especially in cases where the judge has gone against precedent and 
treated non-human animals as more than mere property. For instance, there are 
occasions when directions in a will regarding domestic animals are found to be 
repugnant to public policy. In these cases the courts have responded in favour of the 
                                                             
283 Steven Wise, ‘Dismantling the Barriers to Legal Rights for Nonhuman Animals’ (2001) 7 Animal 
Law 9, 13. 
284 Ibid 16. 
285 Wise, above n 101, 837. Wise identifies Lord Mansfield as an example of a judge who understands 
that the common law is a flexible living organism which changes as morality changes and when 
scientific facts and experiences come to light. See Wise, above n 204, 1288-1289. 
286 Wise, above n 101, 837. 
287 Ibid. Posner argues, with reference to the practical application of legal personhood in the courts, if 
judges are to be persuaded to change the law in the way advocated by Wise, they need to know the 
consequences of such changes, which has a significant impact on the way they make decisions. Posner 
believes this point has not been sufficiently addressed by Wise. See Richard Posner, ‘Animal Rights: 
Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives’ in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum 
(eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004) 51. 
48 
 
non-human animal by disregarding the owner’s wishes.288 A pertinent example of this 
situation is the case of In re Estate of Howard H Brand289 where the testator directed 
that his perfectly healthy horses and mules be destroyed upon his death. The Court 
rejected that directive and noted that, ‘the unique type of “property” involved merits 
special attention. “Property” in domestic pets is of a highly qualified nature, possession 
of which may be subject to limitation and control.’290 Therefore, even though the judge 
in this case still considered the horses and mules to be ‘property’ they were a ‘unique 
type’ which deserved ‘special attention.’ This effectively rejects the historical notion 
that non-human animals are mere property and recognises their inherent worth, along 
with their right not to be killed at the whim of their owner.  
 
With regards to modern judicial decision-making, Wise notes that law-making in 
recent times has begun to reflect a shifting sense of appropriateness of the place of 
non-human animals.291 He states that, ‘not only has the intrinsic value of human beings 
become more commensurable with other values, but non-human life has become 
infused with some intrinsic value.’292 This notion is reflected in the decisions made in 
the deceased estate cases, amongst others, outlined above.293 Recognising the inherent 
worth of an animal is progressive, but not as enlightened as recognising full legal 
personhood rights for non-human animals, such as their right to fairness, equality, 
bodily integrity and bodily liberty.294 In other words, their right not to be treated as a 
resource for human ends.  
 
Obviously, judges who make decisions concerning granting legal personhood rights to 
non-human animals will have to do so with certain practicalities in mind, similar to 
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those they would consider when dealing with the rights of children and the disabled. 
For example, the right to vote is usually restricted to those who are literate and can 
understand the voting procedure, so granting a person who is severely mentally 
disabled the right to vote would be inappropriate. Similarly, the rights of children to 
testify in court is usually only permitted if they can understand their obligation to be 
truthful, so allowing a child who does not understand this requirement to testify is also 
inappropriate. Therefore, granting a non-human animal the right to vote or the right to 
testify in court295 would be equally inappropriate. Thus, rights (and certainly duties) 
need to be judicially qualified for non-human animals. But the need for qualification 
does not disqualify them from eligibility to full legal personhood, rather it means that 
judges must be more flexible in the way they interpret what ‘personhood’ means for 
non-human animals and apply this to their decision-making.296  
 
2 Constitutional Recognition  
A country’s constitution identifies ‘the fundamental set of rules governing matters 
pertaining to its organisation, including delineation of the powers of its separate 
organs, and the rights and duties of its citizens.’297 Anything contained within a 
country’s constitution maintains substantial influence over how those within its 
jurisdiction are treated under law. Therefore, it is significant that several European 
countries, including Switzerland, Germany, Austria and Slovenia, have enacted 
legislation to include animal welfare in their national constitutions.298 For example, 
Article 80 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 
provides for the following:  
 
Art. 80 Protection of animals 
1 The Confederation shall legislate on the protection of animals. 
2 It shall in particular regulate: 
                                                             
295 As bizarre as it sounds to us now, throughout the Middle Ages, non-human animals were subjected 
to litigious proceedings, then usually sentenced, in both secular and ecclesiastical courts across 
continental Europe. For examples of these animal ‘trials’ see Wise, above n 43, 505-13. Of course, today 
these trials are no longer practiced, but some commentators believe they have been replaced by the 
actions of the local animal shelter where animals are executed for ‘crimes’ such as ‘homelessness’ and 
‘aggression’ without any form of legal representation. See Piers Beirne, ‘The Law is an Ass: Reading 
E P Evans’ The Medieval Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals’ (1994) 2(1) Society and 
Animals 27, 43-44 quoted in Bruce, above n 121, 19. 
296 Wise, above n 101, 908. 
297 Trischa Mann and Audrey Blunden (eds), Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
298 Antoine Goetschel, ‘The Animal Voice: Ensuring Interests Through Law’ (2014) 41(7) Brief 32. 
50 
 
a. the keeping and care of animals; 
b. experiments on animals and procedures carried out on living 
animals; 
c. the use of animals; 
d. the import of animals and animal products; 
e. the trade in animals and the transport of animals; 
f. the slaughter of animals. 
3 The enforcement of the regulations is the responsibility of the Cantons, except 
where the law reserves this to the Confederation. 
 
From Article 80 above, it is evident that the Swiss Constitution provides significant 
detail on areas of animal welfare on which the country will regulate.299 This is in 
contrast to other European countries which acknowledge that they will regulate on 
animal welfare, but provide no details of how this will be achieved. For example, 
Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of 23 December 1991 
dedicates only one line to non-human animals: ‘The protection of animals from cruelty 
shall be regulated by law.’ Similarly, the German Constitution does not provide much 
guidance on animal protection by combining their protection with that of nature in a 
single Article,300 whilst the Austrian Constitution excludes hunting and fishing from 
its Federal animal protection legislation.301 Nevertheless, as Goetschel states, 
including non-human animals in a nation’s constitution effectively ensures that animal 
welfare is recognised and valued in the same way that other constitutional rights are 
valued, such as rights concerning property ownership and protection, freedom to 
conduct trade and commerce and the freedom of religion.302 
 
The Swiss have gone even further than simply outlining how they regulate animal 
protection in their constitution. In 1992, Switzerland was the first country in the world 
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to recognise the ‘dignity’ of animals in their constitution; the purpose of which was to 
protect non-human animals against the abuses of gene technology.303 Article 120 is 
now a constitutional principle recognised as having general validity throughout the 
whole Swiss legal system as well as one that guides State action.304 This demonstrates 
the power of including non-human animals in a nation’s constitution. Although there 
is still much controversy surrounding the proper meaning of ‘dignity’ and how it 
translates to non-humans and their treatment under law, it is encouraging that these 
types of conversations are being held amongst their politicians.305 This is more than 
can be said for most other countries throughout the Western world. Michel and 
Kayasseh state that the prevailing legal opinion of the inclusion of the ‘dignity’ of 
animals in their Swiss Constitution is that there is ‘a respect for the inherent value of 
animals… [which] is neither based upon nor exhausts itself in considerations as to 
what use animals can be put to by humans; rather, it respects animals in their own 
being and otherness.’306 In addition, the highest court of Switzerland, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court, made comment as to the constitutional inclusion and held that the 
principal of the ‘dignity’ of non-human animals means that they should ‘at least to a 
certain degree, be regarded and valued as beings of equal stature with humans.’307 
 
It is apparent that the inherent value of non-human animals is not being recognised by 
the Federal parliaments of countries such as Australia and the US, especially when 
these countries make no reference to non-human animals in either of their respective 
anthropocentric constitutions.308 Thus, in order for non-human animals to be 
eventually recognised as ‘persons’ in countries such as Australia and the US, a vital 
first step is to include them in the country’s constitution. Just as the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia are calling for their inclusion and 
recognition in its constitution,309 so too should non-human animals be included. 
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Hence, in a similar vein to the Swiss Constitution, a suggested amendment for the 
Australian Constitution is the recognition of the ‘dignity’ of non-human animals, along 
with the added inclusion of their right not to be used as a resource by humans. If only 
the addition of the recognition of a non-human animal’s dignity were included, as it is 
in Swiss law, the inherent value of an animal will become a legally protected interest 
with constitutional force.310  
 
3 Legislative Change 
The world’s first animal protection laws were enacted by the Puritans of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in their 1641 Body of Liberties.311 This enactment declared 
to protect the colonists’ fundamental rights, including those for women, children, 
servants and non-human animals.312 Article 92 stated that ‘[n]o man shall exercise any 
Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creatures which are usuallie kept for man's 
use.’ Article 93 made it lawful to those leading or driving ‘Cattel’ to rest them if they 
were weary, hungry, sick, or lame ‘in any open place that is not Come, meadow, or 
inclosed for some peculiar use.’ As important as the Puritans' laws were to the 
protections of those exploited, their fundamental failure was that they did not alter the 
ultimate predicament of non-human animals to be used by humans for food and 
labour.313 This was to be expected, particularly since the Puritans were guided by 
biblical sentiment that placed human interests above the interests of non-human 
animals.314 Nevertheless, these laws planted the seed that led to the anti-cruelty statues 
which most countries throughout the world have enacted; each espousing varying 
degrees of protection for non-human animals. 
 
In the past, anti-cruelty laws were primarily concerned with the effect that cruelty 
might have on public sensibilities or on its encouragement of cruel acts towards other 
humans, rather than a concern about actual cruelty to animals.315 This is less likely to 
be the case today, especially considering the recognition that non-human animals can 
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feel pain and do suffer, hence their interests should be protected.316 Indeed, the fact 
that anti-cruelty laws are criminal laws suggests that we take animal interests seriously 
enough to punish violations with the social stigma of a criminal penalty.317 However, 
aside from prohibiting acts such as the torture, torment, unjustifiable injury, overdrive, 
overload, cruel beating, and needless mutilation of non-human animals, these anti-
cruelty laws still allow such cruel practices when they are deemed ‘necessary,’ for 
example in medical experiments, in agricultural practices, or during hunting.318 
Therefore, these laws, although appearing to protect the interests of non-human 
animals, do no such thing when there is an economic benefit to the human in using the 
animal, or the practice is accepted or customary on the part of the animal owner.319  
 
St Pierre asserts that, if language recognising the interests of the non-human animal 
was inserted into legislation, then there would be less room for compromise in 
interpreting statutes and more room to argue for the expansion of animal interests.320 
Until this happens though, the law will continue to require that a non-human animal’s 
interests be observed only when there is some reciprocal human benefit to be gained.321 
This has even proven to be true for countries that have a greater moral concern for 
their animals, such as Britain and other European countries.322 For example, Britain 
has more restrictions on animal use than does the US, but when these differences are 
analysed they prove to be more formal than substantive, especially since both countries 
utilise cruel factory farming practices.323 Ultimately then, for non-human animal 
interests to be legitimately considered and recognised in legislation, it is their property 
status that must first change.  
 
On a more optimistic note, authors such as Kelch take comfort in the fact that past 
legislative exertions which attempt to address the interests of non-human animals, 
although primarily ineffective, demonstrate a trend of increasing concern toward 
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protecting animal interests.324 Indeed, society’s views on practices such as the wearing 
of fur, testing of cosmetics on animals, and the use of battery cages and sow stalls has 
shifted dramatically over the past few decades making these practices highly 
objectionable. These changes in society’s views have, in turn, resulted in changes to 
public policy on these issues.325 Lovorn refers to this as the ‘sweet spot’ of public 
policy toward animals.326 He describes this as the space in between current practices 
and where current polling data suggests society is ready to go in terms of legal reform 
concerning the treatment of non-human animals.327 This, according to Lovorn, is the 
place where lawyers and legislators should focus their efforts in order to eventually 
achieve the final goal of granting legal personhood to non-human animals.328 
 
4 Reconceptualising What Constitutes ‘Property’ 
Jacoby suggests that ‘just as the commodification of the non-human animal models 
that of human slavery, so can the destruction of human slavery model for the 
destruction of the commodification of non-human animals.’329 This is not out of the 
realm of possibilities especially considering the dynamism of property. What 
constitutes property today may not constitute property in the future, just as it was with 
human slaves. Indeed, Gray suggests that ‘the task of the immediate future is, in part, 
to reconceive the law of property for the 21st century’330 which may conceivably place 
non-human animals outside the realm of what currently constitutes ‘property’ for both 
moral and equitable reasons. If humans were to apply the higher moral principles of 
fairness, equality and liberty to all sentient beings then non-human animals could no 
longer be considered to be the property of humans as doing so would violate these 
principles. Just like humans, non-human animals have a desire not to be treated as the 
resource of another and to have their interests considered, particularly their interest in 
not suffering at the hands of their owners for their (the owner’s) benefit. Therefore 
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humans, as members of a civilised society, should recognise that classifying non-
human animals as property is an infringement of their fundamental desire to live free 
from suffering, hence the property status of non-human animals should be abolished, 
as it was for human slaves. 
 
5 Abolishing the Property Status through Incremental Steps 
It is common for animal rights advocates, such as Tom Regan, to demand that there be 
an immediate and complete cessation of all types of animal exploitation, including the 
immediate abolition of the property status of non-human animals.331 Francione, 
although an avid animal rights advocate, argues that this ‘all-or-nothing’ proposition 
is unrealistic in the light of ‘increasingly reactionary political and legal systems.’332 
Instead, Francione proposes that a more realistic approach in achieving the eventual 
abolition of animal exploitation and their property status is through incremental 
steps.333 The cornerstone of Francione’s incremental approach is the rejection of the 
principle of animal welfare (ie that it is permissible to use animals as long as they are 
treated ‘humanely’) and the adoption of a deontological norm that satisfy three 
fundamental conditions.334  
 
The first condition that must be satisfied in applying Francione’s incremental approach 
is that the norm must recognise a non-tradable interest. This goes specifically against 
the principle of animal welfare where all animal interests are regarded as ‘tradable.’ 
The second condition is that the norm must prohibit, rather than regulate, the conduct 
that constitutes a violation of the non-tradable interest. At present there is very little 
conduct toward animals that is prohibited outright, apart from cockfighting or 
dogfighting. The third and final condition is that the norm must not prescribe an 
alternative form of exploitation to counter-act the prohibition of the non-tradable 
interest.335 Francione admits that, although animals will be beneficiaries of such 
prohibitions, they may still be subject to other exploitation because the incremental 
approach, by its definition, has the potential to leave institutionalised exploitation 
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intact.336 For example, prohibiting the dehorning of steers may meet the animals’ 
interest in not being dehorned, but they may still end up being killed for food. 
Nevertheless, the true benefit of this approach lies in the fact that each incremental 
step taken erodes, albeit gradually, the status of non-human animals as property.337  
 
6 Expanding the Standing Doctrine to Include Non-Human Animals 
St Pierre holds that the most significant step in the direction of granting legal 
personhood to non-human animals is by expanding the standing doctrine to include 
them so that they (via human representatives, of course) may litigate to promote and 
protect their own interests.338 As Francione states, ‘standing is a prerequisite for the 
enforcement of rights.’339 Thus, in order for the interests of non-human animals to be 
protected, it is vital that non-human animals are recognised by the courts so that they 
may sue in their own right.340 Because non-human animals need human assistance to 
achieve this, some European countries have implemented ‘qualified animal advocates’ 
to represent non-human animal interests in the course of administrative and criminal 
proceedings.341 For example, in Austria, an Animal Welfare Ombudsman has been 
implemented to represent animal interests in each state.342  
 
Section 41 of the Austrian Animal Welfare Act 2008 sets out the tasks of the Animal 
Welfare Ombudsman, particularly that of representing the interests of animal 
welfare.343 Notably, s 41(4) states that the ‘ombudsman shall have the status of a party 
in administrative proceedings’ which enables them to act on behalf of the animal 
plaintiff. There is also a constitutional provision of professional independence which 
states that the ombudsman ‘is not subject to any instructions in exercising his [sic] 
duties.’344 There are some significant restrictions, however, to the scope of the role of 
the Austrian Animal Welfare Ombudsman, such as being constrained from filing 
appeals in courts of Public Law and limited to filing those proceedings which fall 
within the regime of the Animal Welfare Act 2008 (which excludes provisions 
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concerning animal transportation and experimentation).345 Despite these limitations, 
employing an advocate in such a position would be more effective in addressing the 
harm to the non-human animal than having a lawyer represent the human that has been 
harmed, as Bryant states, from another human’s failure to prevent harm to the 
animal.346 Therefore, it is more effective for the non-human animal to represent itself 
via a human representative such as an ombudsman, than suing through a third party. 
 
Bryant identifies three main arguments for expanding the standing doctrine to include 
non-human animals.347 Bryant’s first argument recognises that, by expanding the 
doctrine, the correct victim, i.e. the non-human animal, will be accurately identified, 
as it is the animal who has suffered the injury and not the human. Therefore, no ‘legal 
fictions’ will be created from expanding standing to the subject animal. Bryant’s 
second argument highlights that, where legal standing is granted in the name of the 
individual that alleges the harm (even if it is an animal), the tests for standing are better 
met than expanding standing to humans that are claiming injury by virtue of injuries 
to another. In other words, the ‘special interest’ test is more easily satisfied whenever 
an injured party acts as the plaintiff.  Bryant’s third argument holds that, when deciding 
whether to grant standing, a direct route is always preferable as it addresses the actual 
harm suffered by the victim and not a secondary harm suffered by a third party.348  
 
In making these arguments, Bryant also concedes that there are some inevitable 
negative consequences that may result from expanding the standing doctrine.349 
Specifically, any litigation which proceeds in the name of non-human animal plaintiffs 
will most likely result in fruitless debates and arguments about the characteristics of 
animals which are ‘human’ enough to warrant their recognition as ‘persons.’350 Bryant 
contends that the fundamental problem with these arguments is that they are not able 
to be resolved completely and hence this uncertainty may inadvertently affect the 
decision about whether or not to grant standing to a non-human animal plaintiff.351 
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Thus, the real issue of granting non-human animals standing gets lost in the endless 
debate about how ‘like us’ animals are when what really should be at issue is how their 
legal status prevents them from having their day in court. Nevertheless, with the 
inevitable advances in scientific knowledge it is likely these debates will lessen and 
eventually the interests of non-human animals will be recognised by courts so that 
ultimately they will have the capacity to sue in their own names. The appointment of 
a legal advocate or ombudsman to represent non-human animals in court will 
undoubtedly speed up this process. 
 
7 Economic and Technological Considerations 
Whilst not specifically a legal requirement, Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright suggest 
that economics and technology also play a major role in effecting legal change.352 The 
authors use the example of slavery to demonstrate that its abolition did not occur until 
it was assisted by economics and technological considerations.353 In support of their 
views they quote the famous French international jurist, Georges Scelle (1878-1961): 
  
The struggle against slavery, the protection of the bodily freedom of individuals only 
began in international law when it is was clearly demonstrated that slave labour has 
economic drawbacks and that the progress of modern technology allows it to be 
replaced. Whenever human manpower has not been replaced, slave labour and forced 
labour still exist, despite all efforts made to proscribe it. This proves that a moral 
conviction, even if of a general character, does not override the necessities of 
economic life in the formation of legal rules.354 
 
These points are analogous to the position of non-human animals and their current 
place in society. In the (slightly altered) words of Georges Scelle, ‘when it is clearly 
demonstrated that [animal] labour has economic drawbacks and that the progress of 
modern technology allows it to be replaced’ then the use of non-human animals for 
labour will cease. We have seen that this has already occurred with the introduction of 
modern farming machinery replacing non-human animal labour in most Western 
countries. This statement can also be applied to the production of animals for food. 
For example, when it is too costly to produce meat, both from an economic and 
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environmental perspective,355 and modern technology allows meat to be replaced 
through the manufacture of in vitro or synthetic meat, then non-human animals will no 
longer be used as a food resource for humans. As Georges Scelle states, it takes more 
than a moral conviction of the masses to make such a significant legal change, thus the 
economic and technological considerations of such change cannot be ignored. 
 
C Anticipating Resistance to Change 
Even in a situation where the societal, economic, environmental and technological 
elements are supportive of legal change, there will always be resistance to change 
itself. In his highly influential article promoting legal rights for the environment, Stone 
anticipated this resistance.356 He noted that ‘[t]hroughout legal history, each successive 
extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable…each 
time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new “entity,” the proposal is 
bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable.’357 This is because until the entity in 
question is recognised as having rights, ‘we cannot see it as anything but a thing for 
the use of “us” - those who are holding rights at the time.’358 This is as true for nature, 
as it was for slaves, women and children at different points in history.359 It is also true 
for non-human animals as they exist in our society today. It was not until three decades 
after Stone published his article that lawmakers and communities began to take his 
thesis seriously as a novel and potentially powerful means to protect the 
environment.360 So too will it take decades before non-human animals are recognised 
as sentient beings who have the right not to be treated, in Stone’s words, as ‘a thing 
for the use of “us.”’361 Despite this resistance, any positive changes for non-human 
animals which are enshrined in law will provide them with the protections they need 
to be regarded as legal ‘persons’ in their own right. 
                                                             
355 In his book, Francione discusses the tremendous inefficiencies and resulting costs to our planet of 
animal agriculture. For example, ‘food’ animals consume more protein than they produce so that, for 
every kilogram of animal protein produced, animals consume an average of 6 kilograms of plant protein 
from grains and over 100,000 litres of water (it only takes 900 litres of water to produce the same 
kilogram of wheat). See Francione, above n 16, 36-7.  
356 Stone, above n 278, 450. 
357 Ibid 453-55. 
358 Ibid 455 (emphasis in original). 
359 Peter Burdon, ‘What if trees could sue?’ ABC Environment, May 17, 2011 
<http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2011/05/17/3216161.htm>. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Lovron suggests that it may take longer than three decades to achieve legal personhood for non-
human animals due to our major reliance on animals. He states that this change would most likely run 
the same course as the abolition of slavery (ie approximately 150 years) with the achievement of 
personhood for non-human animals occurring around the mid twenty-second century (assuming a start 





Legal personhood is attainable for non-human animals through the inherent flexibility 
and adaptability of the common law, combined with its long standing recognition of 
personality in other non-human entities, such as corporations and governments. 
Greater social awareness and increased activity toward the better treatment of animals 
indicates that society’s views are changing in relation to non-human animals. Whilst 
societal change drives legal change, it is legal reform that is required in making legal 
personhood a reality for non-human animals. Therefore, legal reform in the form of 
constitutional and legislative changes are required in order to recognise the inherent 
value or ‘dignity’ and particular interests of non-human animals. Additionally, a 
progressive and enlightened judiciary is required to recognise those interests, including 
a non-human animal’s interest to sue in their own right. Before any reforms are 
effective in protecting animal interests, their property status must first be abolished. 
According to Francione, this may only be achieved through incremental steps due to 
the significant impact such a change would have on society. Reconceptualising the 
concept of property to exclude non-human animals will assist in abolishing their 
property status. Economic and technological factors must also be considered in 
effecting legal change for non-human animals. Thus, by implementing the above 
reforms, non-human animals will be legally able to transition from their status as 
property to a status that more closely resembles or characterises legal personhood, 





Our current legal framework concerning non-human animals in Australia reflects the 
values of the majority of Australian society. Centuries of human supremacy, in 
combination with the continued ownership of animals, has resulted in the everyday 
requirements of society being heavily dependent upon the use (and abuse) of non-
human animals. Today our society relies on non-human animals to fulfil a variety of 
wants and desires such as food, clothing, entertainment, protection, health and 
companionship. However, most of society are unaware that, by using non-human 
animals for these purposes, they are subjecting them to unnecessary suffering. 
Thankfully, this level of unawareness is changing within society. Now, more than ever, 
people are questioning the way non-human animals are treated, particularly in farming 
practices, but also in other areas such as medical experimentation and within the 
entertainment industries. This questioning has led to some minor changes to the way 
non-human animals are treated under law. However, more significant reforms are 
required in order to fully protect their interests. 
 
This thesis based its argument on the premise that the use of non-human animals 
cannot be morally justified for any reason. The use of non-human animals is currently 
permissible because they are the property of humans who may do with them as they 
wish. As the property of humans, non-human animals have no recognisable interests 
or ‘rights’ which means they are subject to the ‘property paradigm’ whereby their 
interests are always subordinated to human interests. Their property status also means 
they are not recognised by the courts as legal ‘persons’ and thus have no legal capacity 
to protect their interests and sue in their own right. This thesis has provided arguments 
from commentators that state that animals are better off as the property of humans due 
to the protections they are afforded. These protections do indeed apply to a few (select) 
companion animals, but on the whole, the property status of non-human animals means 
that they are mere property of which humans have ultimate control. This thesis has 
argued that non-human animals should not be considered the property of humans, 
because they are more than inanimate objects. Instead, they are sentient beings that 
can feel pain and seek out pleasure, just like humans. Thus their interests deserve equal 
consideration with human interests. Additionally, humans can no longer be justified in 
treating non-human animals like human slaves were once treated, and hence humans’ 




In order to be recognised as a legal ‘person,’ and thus be afforded the rights of this 
classification, the legal status of non-human animals must transition from being 
‘property’ to a classification that resembles legal ‘personhood.’ There have been many 
attempts at developing theories that resemble legal personhood, but most have been 
criticised as merely ‘tinkering’ with the current property status of non-human animals. 
Some critics even contend that if non-human animals are granted the same rights as 
humans, then human rights would suffer. Others doubt there is any competition of 
rights between humans and non-human animals because they believe that non-human 
animals cannot be granted the same rights as a person for the simple fact that they are 
not ‘human.’ This theory is quickly discounted when the ‘personhood’ of non-human 
entities, such as corporations, has been made possible under law and subsequently 
accepted by the judiciary and society. If corporations can be granted similar rights to 
humans and are considered legal ‘persons’ then so too can non-human animals be 
granted the same status. This thesis finds that there is no compelling reason why these 
rights cannot be granted, hence, legal personhood is attainable for non-human animals. 
 
Therefore, due to the flexibility of the common law and its ability to classify other 
non-human entities as legal ‘persons,’ more can be done from within a legal context 
to assist non-human animals transition from property to legal personhood. For 
example, legislative provisions which truly acknowledge an animal’s interests, without 
any reference to exemptions or exceptions that benefit humans, will result in the 
recognition of a non-human animal’s right not to be treated as a resource. 
Constitutional amendments that recognise the ‘dignity’ of non-human animals will 
ensure that animals are valued in the same way that other constitutional rights are 
valued, resulting in legally protected interests for non-human animals. In the past there 
have been examples of progressive judicial decision-making whereby judges go 
against precedent in the pursuit of justice for non-human animals. However, these 
cases are rare. Hence, more enlightened judicial decision-making which incorporates 
the current knowledge and science surrounding non-human animals, along with 
society’s changing views, is needed for animals’ to transition to being recognised as 




However, all this law reform is ‘fruitless’ unless we change the legal status of non-
human animals.362 Therefore, to effectively transition to a classification of legal 
‘persons,’ non-human animals’ must be reconceptualised as ‘non-property’ and their 
property status abolished; just as the property status of human slaves had to be 
abolished for slavery to end. Because abolishing the property status of non-human 
animals is a significant legal and societal change, it can only realistically be achieved 
through incremental steps which ultimately lead to the total abolition of their property 
status. Francione states that, although it has its failings, the incremental approach will 
be more politically and socially acceptable, even where it is not welcomed by animal 
exploiters.363 Thus, despite its failings, taking incremental steps toward the total 
abolition of the property status of non-human animals is the most achievable approach 
to adopt in our highly animal-dependant world. Expanding the standing doctrine to 
include non-human animals will also move non-human animals closer to their 
recognition as legal ‘persons,’ as will the effective representation of non-human 
animals in court through an advocate or ombudsman. 
 
It is generally accepted that change is rarely openly received and thus resistance should 
be anticipated, especially where such change has a significant impact on people’s lives. 
Abolishing the property status of non-human animals would have considerable 
consequences for humans, even more so for those humans who depend heavily on 
using non-human animals for their livelihood. Therefore, it is likely there would be 
substantial push-back from many members of society with regard to changing the legal 
status of non-human animals. With this in mind, it is not surprising that non-human 
animals have not yet been declared ‘persons’ under law. This, of course, does not mean 
society cannot, it just means that it has not decided to do so yet. Indeed, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the common law is more than able to implement such a change if 
society were willing. Therefore, notwithstanding any resistance to change, by 
implementing the suggested legal reforms in combination with growing social 
awareness and the current economic, environmental and technological conditions that 
exist today, non-human animals can transition from being the mere ‘property’ of 
humans to the undoubtedly more equitable status of legal ‘persons.’   
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